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INTRODUCTION
In the canonical nineteenth-century case of Pierson v. Post, ju-
rists considered the elements of possession necessary to allow a
hunter to claim property rights in a wild fox.1 The court sat divided
on whether some rights should inure to the hunter based on his hot
pursuit of the wild animal.' The dissent argued that such a rule
would beneficially encourage fox hunting,3 but the court ultimately
ruled that property rights only come into being once the fox is in-
hand.' Like the property regimes governing the capture of wild ani-
mals, patent law also awards first-in-time rights. But, instead of
requiring evidence of physical possession, patent law grants rights
to the first qualified inventor.' Jurisdictions differ, however, in the
elements used to distinguish the first qualified inventor from others
in the field.6
Most of the world employs a "first-to-file" system, which
awards priority based solely on the timing of an applicant's patent
application filing.7 In a first-to-file system, when two or more enti-
1. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1805); Bethany Berger, It's Not About
the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2006).
2. See Pierson, 3 Cai. 175.
3. See id. At the time the case was decided, fox hunting was encouraged and rewarded
as a way of eliminating the troublesome animals. See id.
4. See id. (holding that a hunter first acquires a property interest in animals when he
has "so wounded, circumvented or ensnared them, so as to deprive them of their natural lib-
erty, and subject them to the control of their pursuer"),
5. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123 (2006);
Paul M. Schoenhard, Reconceptualizing Inventive Conception: Strengthening, Not Abandon-
ing the First-To-Invent System, 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 567, 606 (2007) ("[A]t various milestones,
United States patent law recognizes rights against infringers, competing claimants, and the
government.").
6. Patent rights are territorial in nature. Each country has its own patent laws and en-
forcement regimes. Some blocs of countries-such as the thirty-six signatories to the
European Patent Convention (EPC)-cooperate in the administration of unitary patent exami-
nation systems. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 255, 272 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (entered into force on Oct. 7,
1977); cf Jerome Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus:
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85 (2007)
(discussing the interaction between territorial laws and efforts toward harmonization).
7. See Toshiko Takenaka, The Future of Patent Law: Rethinking the United States
First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure
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ties separately pursue patent rights on the same invention, only the
first entity to file for patent protection is awarded patent rights.
The conventional "first-to-file" identifier is something of a mis-
nomer because the name focuses attention on the priority contest
between competing applicants. In general, first-to-file systems ex-
hibit a focus on the filing-date that extends beyond these priority
contests to include statutory bar provisions that block the patenting
of an invention that was publicly available at any time prior to the
patent application filing date.8 Some first-to-file countries provide
an exception permitting an inventor's own pre-filing disclosure. 9
§ 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 Hous. L. REV. 621, 624 (2002) (discussing ele-
ments of a first-to-file system); European Patent Convention, supra note 6; Tokkyo Ho
[Japanese Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, arts. 29-30; Steve Seidenberg, A Sea Change in
Patent Law: Proposed Legislation Would Wean the United States from a 'First to Invent' Ap-
proval System, 92 A.B.A. J. 49 (2006) ("The United States is the only nation in the world that
follows the first-to-invent principle in awarding patents.").
8. Notably, the European Patent Office examination process does not offer any oppor-
tunity to assert rights based on a prior invention date except under the limited circumstances
when a duty of confidentiality has been breached. See European Patent Convention, art. 54,
2, Oct. 5, 1973, http://www.epo.org/patentslaw/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar54.html ("The
state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a
written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the Euro-
pean patent application."); Id., art 55, $ 1 (a), http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/htmll
epc/1973/e/ar55.html ("[A] disclosure of the invention shall not be taken into consideration if
it occurred no earlier than six months preceding the filing of the European patent application
and if it was due to, or in consequence of... an evident abuse in relation to the applicant or
his legal predecessor."); see also Joseph Straus, Grace Period and the European and Interna-
tional Patent Law: Analysis of Key Legai and Socio-Economic Aspects, in 20 UC STUDIES:
STUDIES IN INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 3 (Gerhard Schricker ed., 2001); IPR HELPDESK,
GRACE PERIOD AND INVENTION LAW IN EUROPE AND SELECTED STATES 6, http://www.ipr-
helpdesk.org/documents/GracePeriodinventionLaw_0000004514_00.xml.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2009).
9. Where it is available in Europe, the grace period is:
understood as a specific period of time preceding the filing of a patent application,
during which disclosures ... of the invention for which the patent application is
filed by the inventor or his/her successor in title do not constitute prior art in re-
spect of the patent application at hand. [Such] disclosures do not establish a priority
date, i.e. do not provide for immunity for the inventor/applicant against parallel or
later independent disclosures, including patent applications of third parties.
Joseph Straus, EXPERT OPINION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN THE EURO-
PEAN PATENT LAW 48 (2000) (emphasis added), available at http://tiny.cc/Ew7mc; see also
Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591, 610-11 (1994)
(describing limited grace periods available under Japanese, Australian, and Canadian law);
Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-To-Invent Principle From a Compara-
tive Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39
Hous. L. REV. 621, 626-29, 663 (2002); JAPANESE GROUP OF AIPPI, A STUDY OF GRACE
PERIOD AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF PATENTABILITY IN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PATENT
SYSTEMS 1 (Mar. 2000) (stating that 87% of 121 national and regional patent systems provide
for some type of grace period.); William Lesser, Grace Periods in First-to-File Countries, 9
EUR, INTELL. PROP. REV. 81 (1987); IPR HELPDESK, GRACE PERIOD AND INVENTION LAW IN
Fall 20091
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 55 2009-2010
56 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:53
However, that grace period is often severely limited in scope and
duration."l
U.S. patent law stands apart from the rest of the world: it alone ad-
heres to a "first-to-invent" system, which allows an inventor to assert
first-inventor rights and claim priority back to the date when the inven-
tion was first conceived.' Thus, in a priority contest between competing
inventors, the inventors' dates of conception and reduction-to-practice
take precedence over their application filing dates. 2
Like "first-to-file," the "first-to-invent" identifier is a misnomer be-
cause the name focuses attention on the priority contest between
competing inventors. The U.S. first-to-invent systems exhibit a focus on
the invention date extending beyond this head-to-head priority contest to
include novelty provisions that allow an inventor to antedate putative
prior art by reaching back to claim priority as of her date of conception,
thus negating the patent-blocking effect of third-party technological ad-
vances disclosed in the interim between conception and patent
application filing."
Despite the invention-date-based focus of the U.S. patent system,
two considerations greatly restrict an inventor's ability to claim priority
back to the date of conception. First, high evidentiary requirements im-
pede attempts to prove priority unless the inventor painstakingly and
contemporaneously recorded the inventive process.'4 Second, the statu-
tory bar established in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) blocks the patenting of any
invention publicly available or on sale more than one year before the
patent application filing date, regardless of the date of conception."5 The
EUROPE AND SELECTED STATES H 3-4, http://www.ipr-helpdesk.org/documents/
GracePeriodinventionLaw_0000004514j00.xml.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (describing
grace periods in Portugal, Spain, Russia, China, Canada, Japan, and other countries).
10. See supra note 9.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2008) (providing the framework for an interference proceeding);
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2008) (providing the legal standard for judging priority between two
inventors each claiming patent rights).
12. In the Unites States, a priority contest between competing patent applicants is
known as an "interference proceeding." The administrative patent law judges sitting on the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) conduct the interference proceeding as an
inter partes trial. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2008) (providing the framework for an interference pro-
ceeding). The priority contest can also occur in the context of litigation at the district court
level. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
13. See id. at 1380 (rejecting the prior art status of articles used in an obviousness rejec-
tion because those articles were published "well after the date of conception").
14. See infra notes 59 and 60.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008) (a patent may not issue if "the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States."); JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 156 (3rd ed. 2009); Pfaff v. Wells Elects., Inc.,
525 U.S. 55, 57 (1998).
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ability to swear behind prior art, coupled with the statutory bar of
§ 102(b), creates a one-year grace period for filing in the United States 6
Unlike the limited grace period available under first-to-file systems, the
U.S. grace period is not restricted either to self-disclosures or necessarily
in duration. 7
Although I recognize that the terms "first-to-invent" and "first-to-
file" are well-ingrained, I would shift the terminology to distinguish
between systems that are filing-date-focused and those that are inven-
tion-date-focused.
For the past forty years, various patent reform proposals have called
for the harmonization of the U.S. system with the rest of the world. The
Patent Reform Act of 2009 would eliminate the U.S. grace period except
for disclosures by the patent applicant or subsequent to public disclo-
sures by the patent applicant.' 9 For years, academics and policy-makers
have argued extensively over the potential benefits and harms of the
Although rarely at issue, prior art disclosed in a prior foreign patent filing, as defined in
§ 102(d) of the Patent Act, takes precedence over the statutory novelty provisions, as does
evidence that the purported inventor was not the actual inventor under § 102(f). See U.S. PAT-
ENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE ("USPTO"), MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 715
(8th ed., rev. 7, July 2008) [hereinafter MPEP].
16. MUELLER, supra note 15, at 159 ("So long as the patent application is filed within
one year of the first instance of the invention being released into the public domain or com-
mercially exploited ... either by the patent applicant or a third party, the right to a U.S. patent
will not be lost under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)."). This date one year prior to the effective filing date
of a patent application is typically referred to as the "critical date*" Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 57 ("On
April 19, 1982, petitioner. .. filed an application for a patent.... Therefore, April 19, 1981,
constitutes the critical date for purposes of the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); if the 1-year
period began to run before that date, Pfaff lost his right to patent his invention."); See also
Rebecca Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publications to Create Prior Art: A
Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358, 2359 (2000).
17. The grace period is not strictly limited to one year. For instance, an earlier-filed
patent application that qualifies as novelty-defeating prior art only under § 102(e) of the Patent
Act has an effective date that reaches all the way back to the application's filing at the
USPTO. An inventor can, however, antedate § 102(e) prior art by proving an even earlier in-
vention date, regardless of whether that timeline extends back more than one year. MPEP,
supra note 15, at § 2136.05; 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.08 (Matthew
Bender 2008) ("[A]n applicant may use a Rule 131 affidavit to avoid another applicant's prior
domestic filing date, even though it is more than one year prior to the application date.").
18. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515 & H.R. 1260, 111 th Cong. (2009);
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145 & H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of
2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); United States Patent and Trademark Organization Act
of 1997, H.R. 400, 105th Cong. (1998); Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R.
4978, 102d Cong. (1992); Patent Reform Act of 1967 S. 1691 & H.R. 5924, 90th Cong.
(1967). See generally Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 9 (1992); George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate: First-to-Invent vs. First-
to-File, 1967 DUKE L.J. 923 (1967), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1371351; Charles
L. Gholz, First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK Soc'Y 891 (2000); Mi-
chael Martin, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its Origin, 49 IDEA
435 (2009).
19. See S. 515, § 2, & H.R. 1260, § 3.
Fall 20091
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proposed changes20 However, like the dissenting opinion in Pierson v.
Post,2' the arguments raised on both sides typically lack meaningful em-
pirical support.22 Most notably, the first-to-file patent reform debate has
not produced any empirical data apart from analyses of the results of the
rare interference proceedings between competing inventors. 23 Missing is
any evidence of the importance of an applicant's ability to antedate
would-be prior art during ordinary ex parte patent prosecution.24 The
20. See, e.g., Perspective on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2005)
(statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, Former Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks); Margo Bag-
ley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47
B.C. L. REV. 217 (2006); Margo Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a First-
Inventor-to-File World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1035 (2008); Mark Lemley & Colleen Chien,
Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299 (2003); Ryan K.
Dickey, The First-to-Invent Patent Priority System: An Embarrassment to the International
Community, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 283 (2006); Stephanie Gore, Eureka! But I Filed Too Late...
: The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 293 (1993); Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-to-File Patent System: A Proposal,
26 U. BALT. L. REv. 67 (1997); Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, The "First-to-File" Patent System:
Why Adoption Is NOT an Option!, 14 RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 3 (2007), available at
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl4il/article3.pdf; Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush
to a First-to-File Patent System in the United States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Re-
ward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L.
Sci. & TECH. 757 (2006); Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent
Law Harmonization, 22 N. Ky. L. REV. 579 (1995); Kim Taylor, Patent Harmonization Treaty
Negotiations on Hold: The "First To File" Debate Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 521 (1994);
Whitney E. Fraser Tiedemann, First-to-File: Promoting the Goals of the United States Patent
System as Demonstrated Through the Biotechnology Industry, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 477 (2007);
Donald R. Dunner, First-To-File: Should Our Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y, 561 (1986); R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:36 (4th
ed. 2009)(collecting sources on system advantages and disadvantages).
21. See 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (arguing that a rule
awarding rights based on pursuit would create a better incentive to hunting the "wild and nox-
ious beast").
22. Shih-Tse Lo & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Does it Matter Who Has the Right to Patent:
First-to-Invent or First-to-File? Lessons from Canada (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. w14926, April 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1394833
("Unfortunately, no empirical work is available to substantiate these claimed benefits and
costs of the two doctrines, which would help us understand how the Reform, if passed and
signed into law, will affect U.S. inventive activity.").
23. To be clear, several empirical articles have focused on the impact of the change on
priority contests. Lemley & Chien, supra note 20; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-
Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'v. 425, 427 (2002) (stating that between 1983 and 2000, the first-to-file won 1917 of the
2858 interference cases). But see Charles L. Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent
Interferences, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 163, 181 (2002) (reporting that USPTO
data suggests that the first-to-file has recently been winning in only 52.5% of the cases); Dun-
ner, supra note 20, at 561.
24. In the ordinary course of patent prosecution, a patent applicant may antedate prior
art by filing an affidavit or declaration to establish prior invention under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131.
This process is also known as "swearing behind" a prior art reference. I find that interferences
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only published statistic regarding the prevalence of such prior-invention
assertions appears as an un-sourced estimate in a 1988 student note.25
This paper presents a normative study of patent prosecution by ex-
amining the role that invention-date-based novelty rights play in U.S.
patent law. Three sources inform the primary results: the prosecution
history files of 21,000+ patent applications filed in the past decade; a
survey of 1,000+ patent practitioners regarding their use of the novelty
provisions of the Patent Act; and a collection of 11,000,000+ prior art
references cited in recently-issued patents. Additional compilations of
prosecution file histories for patents identified as either (1) valuable or
(2) worthless supplement these data sets and allow for an evaluation of
the differential importance of the novelty rights. Finally, a set of opin-
ions from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)
evidences the difficulty of proving a prior invention date.
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS: During prosecution, most patent applicants
contend with non- 102(b) prior art that could be antedated. Yet, very few
applicants actually attempt to assert prior-invention rights. A miniscule
0.1% of cases in my large cohort sample included an assertion of novelty
rights that directly led to an issued patent.26 Claiming priority to a pre-
filing invention date requires that an applicant prove prior conception
and due diligence or reduction-to-practice. The difficulty of attempting
to prove these elements are laid-out in a set of administrative patent ap-
peal decisions where 77% of attempts to antedate references were
rejected by the administrative court.
Given the difficulty of asserting invention-date-based novelty rights,
it is unsurprising that applicants are more likely to assert such rights in
are about forty-times rarer than attempts to assert invention-date novelty fights in ex parte
cases. See infra pt. II.G.
25. Charles Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 543, 580 (1988) ("The
Patent Office estimates that such section 131 affidavits are filed in three to five percent of the
patent applications."). I contacted Mr. Macedo-now a prominent patent litigator and author-
but the original source of the estimate for rule 131 usage appears lost to the ages (personal
correspondence on file with author). Acting USPTO Director Jon Doll indicated to me that the
USPTO does not track this specific measure (personal correspondence on file with author). A
clearly incorrect German report suggests that the U.S. grace period was utilized in approxi-
mately "every fifth patent application" throughout the 1990s. GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY
FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN PATENT LAW-
A US-GERMANY COMPARISON BASED ON HIGHER EDUCATION 3 (2002), available at
http://www.bmbf.de/pub/neuheitsschonfrist-imipatentrecht.pdf. See also Edward Walter-
scheid, Rule 131 Practice, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 336 (1975)("Even a cursory review of the
published cases reveals the great reliance of applicants on Rule 131 practice.").
26. Taking this result one step further, I also found the assertion of invention-date nov-
elty was unnecessary for patentability in at least some of these twenty cases. Notably, several
of these inventions were also patented in Europe under a regime where priority rights cannot
reach back beyond the filing date.
Fall 2009]
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cases of highly valuable inventions, choosing not to waste money in less
valuable cases. Furthermore, and perhaps contrary to conventional
wisdom, my findings suggest that individual inventors assert invention-
date-based novelty rights relatively less often and less successfully than
large, publicly traded companies. Lastly, a practitioner survey of 1000+
patent law professionals reveals, inter alia, a shared concern that
attempts to antedate prior art leave patents open to challenge during liti-
gation by providing "fodder" for validity challenges.
OUTLINE: Part I introduces the longstanding debate over the pro-
posed switch from a patent system keyed by invention date to one driven
solely by application filing date. Part II presents empirical evidence on
the assertion of invention-date-based rights during the ex parte patent
prosecution process. This analysis introduces and integrates six
newly-developed sets of data, each focusing on a different aspect of in-
vention-date-based novelty rights outside of the interference priority
contest context. In particular, Part II.A analyzes the frequency of at-
tempts to antedate prior art references based on a study of the file
histories of 21,000+ utility patent applications filed between 2000 and
2007. Part 11.B considers and rejects the idea that the strength of the
one-year statutory bar deters attempts to antedate. Part lI.C considers
provisional patent applications and their role as a partial substitute for
asserting invention-date-based rights. Part II.D reports on the use of
invention-date-based novelty rights during the prosecution of patents
recognized as carrying high value. Specifically, for this portion, I con-
sider (1) patents involved in litigation and (2) patents listed with the
FDA as covering approved therapeutic drugs. To compare these results, I
also report on the use of invention-date-based novelty rights during the
prosecution of patents identified as worthless. Part II.E conveys the re-
sults of a survey of 1000+ U.S. attorneys and patent agents regarding,
inter alia, their reliance on novelty rights during patent prosecution. Part
II.F reports the results of a study of recent BPAI decisions determining
the success vel non of attempts on appeal to antedate prior art based on
prior invention date. Part II.G presents evidence on the prevalence of the
assertion of first-inventor rights in interference proceedings. Finally, Part
III concludes by integrating these separate empirical studies and sug-
gests that policy-makers consider reform measures calibrated to garner
the benefits of a first-to-file system while lessening its impact.
I have hesitated in writing this article because of my own affinity for
rights that derive primarily from invention rather than formal filing.27
27. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform and the Ethos of the American Inventor, Pat-
ently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/01/patent-reform-a.html (Jan 17, 2008, 11:10
EST).
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Any changes to the U.S. patent system should protect the legitimate hope
that new entrants can still win the patenting game.
I. KEYING RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATE
In this section, I introduce the general policy debate between sys-
tems that are filing-date-focused and those that are invention-date-
focused. A primary argument against an invention date focus is its lack
of clarity.2 Although the novelty provisions of U.S. patent law focus on
the invention date, U.S. patent applicants need not actually disclose their
dates of invention, conception, or reduction to practice. 9 In fact, inven-
tion dates are often kept secret, even during the process of claiming
rights based on a prior invention date. The motivation for this allowance
for ongoing secrecy makes some sense considering that the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and the patent applicants are the only
parties directly involved in the prosecution process. In the course of its
business, the USPTO does not concern itself with information regarding
the invention date. Rather, absent contrary evidence, patent examiners
simply presume the invention date is identical to the filing date.30 While
the USPTO is simply indifferent to whether the applicant discloses an
invention date, a patent applicant-the only "party" in ordinary ex parte
patent prosecution-will prefer to keep the invention date secret from
28. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation:
The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
175, 210-211 (2001); John R. Thomas, Patent System Reform: The Responsibility of the Rule-
maker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
727, 749 (2002); Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2008) ("Patent claims are often intentionally drafted
with vague and ambiguous language, in order to preserve sufficient maneuverability for future
litigation."). The unknown invention date creates a potential "fuzzy-property" problem similar
to that described by James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer in their influential book. PATENT
FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2008)
("[Ijncreasingly, patents fail to provide clear notice of the scope of patent rights. Thus, inno-
vators find it increasingly difficult to determine whether a technology will infringe upon
anyone's patents, giving rise to inadvertent infringement. Similarly, they find it increasingly
costly to find and negotiate the necessary patent licenses in advance of their technology devel-
opment and adoption decisions. Thus, clearance procedures that work well for tangible
property are undercut by a profusion of fuzzy patent rights.").
29. Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases and Materials on Patent Law 320 (1998) (noting
the ad hoc nature of the disclosure of dates of conception, reduction to practice, and diligence
through Rule 131); MUELLER, supra note 15, at 189.
30. In this sense, the U.S. system could be described as having a filing-date-focused
default rule that may be set aside when an applicant provides sufficient evidence. See Griffith
v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating the default rule); See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 106 (2002) (generally explaining the
power of default rules).
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third parties who may later attempt to invalidate the patent. As a re-
sponder to my practitioner survey indicated, a patent can be more
valuable if opponents do not have "a known target date."3' Furthermore,
in many cases, the inventors themselves cannot pinpoint their legally
cognizable invention date.32
Patent law would remain complicated even if U.S. patent rights were
keyed to the effective filing date, but the simple temporal demarcation
would facilitate the determination by all concerned parties of whether a
given activity constitutes prior art. Such newfound clarity would begin at
the point of filing and continue throughout the life of the patent.33 The
direct cost of achieving this simplicity is borne by the patent applicant
because the filing-date-focused rules cleanly sever the patent applicant's
potential rights to antedate prior art references. Indirectly, this switch
may diminish future incentives to innovate and disclose innovation
through the patent system. In the simplest of models, the filing-date fo-
cus would drive some potential applicants to file for protection even
earlier and compel others to simply drop out of the patent race.35 Sup-
porters of invention-date-based patent rights argue that the switch would
lead to a rushed patent application process, a higher number of low qual-
ity applications, and a procedure that favors large corporations at the
36
expense of individual inventors and emerging companies.
31. Response 804324590 to Dennis Crouch, Survey: Swearing Behind Prior Art ("Sur-
vey"), infra app. 3. See infra pt. II.E. 1 for detailed survey information.
32. The determination of an invention date requires a sometimes difficult process of
sufficiently proving the timing of either the reduction to practice of the invention as claimed or
the conception of the invention followed by due diligence. See infra pt. II (reviewing the legal
rules and process of antedating).
33. Even if the invention-date based novelty and priority provisions were eliminated,
invention dates would likely continue to be important for resolving disputes over inventorship.
See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Hendrick, 573 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting co-
inventorship claim).
34. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65 (2009) (questioning the wisdom of encouraging early filing); Suzanne Scotchmer &
Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law, 21 RAND J. EcON. 131, 131-146 (1990).
The elimination of invention-date-based patent rights invariably shifts focus to filing and away
from inventing; as a consequence, the patent system tends to "dilute the incentive to carry out
R&D and may lower the overall level of inventive activity." Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note 22,
at 4.
35. See Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note 22, at 5-6 ("We find that the 1987 Canadian
Patent Reforms [sic] did not change R&D efforts by Canadian inventors. However, the Re-
forms seemed to have a small negative impact on patenting of Canadian domestic-oriented
industries in Canada, the U.S. or Europe[. The reforms also] skewed the ownership of patented
inventions towards large corporations. These findings suggest that a switch from first-to-invent
to first-to-file may harm a country's inventive activity"). Lo and Sutthiphisal focus only on
changes in the priority contest rules and do not consider the impact of altered novelty provi-
sions.
36. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 96 (2003) ("As recognized by the com-
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The U.S. novelty provisions and accompanying grace period, long-
regarded as important policy tools, offer inventors leeway to continue
developing an invention and determine its potential commercial value.37
The grace period is seen as particularly important to independent inven-
tors, who often need to disclose their inventions to the public in order to
assess the commercial potential and then procure financing for patent
prosecution.38 Moreover, the one-year grace period provides important
flexibility to university researchers, many of whom become entrepre-
neurs by commercializing research initiated in an academic setting.39
This debate is not occurring in a vacuum. On the contrary, most
countries have already chosen to base patent priority rights exclusively
on the filing date.4° Potential value exists in a unifying rule that creates
efficiencies in processing international patent applications."
Much of the debate has focused on priority contests. On this topic,
42supporters of invention-date-based rights call upon natural law 4 -
suggesting that the more deserving party is the first inventor-and U.S.
Constitutional principles.4 The infrequency of interference proceedings,
mercialization theory, a shift to a first-to-file system may lead to an increased likelihood that
neither party in a priority dispute will remain with a valid patent because the increased incen-
tive to file early that may operate to make one party a winner on priority might also have
caused that party to file an application with inadequate disclosure.").
37. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting
that the policies underlying § 102(b) include "allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of
time following sales activity to determine the potential economic value of a patent" (citing
Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); Bagley, The Need for
Speed (and Grace), supra note 20, at 1051 (discussing importance of the grace period); James
R. Barney, Note, An Overview of the Pros and Cons of Provisional Patent Applications, 1
YALE SYMp. L. & TECH. 2, 4 (1999) ("The one-year grace period of § 102(b) is a very impor-
tant element of the U.S. patent system.").
38. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace), supra note 20, at 1037.
39. Id. at 1051.
40. See sources, supra note 7.
41. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R. 4978, 102d Cong. (1992); Hearing
on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks and the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admini-
stration of Justice, 102d Cong. 65 (1992) (statement of Professor Robert Merges, School of
Law, Boston University); Scott Erickson, Patent Law and New Product Development: Does
Priority Claim Basis Make a Difference?, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 327, 327 (1999); Gholz, supra
note 18, at 893 ("[lt would be good for the world market and for industrialized civilization as
a whole if the United States would change its archaic first-to- invent system, which is un-
doubtedly the most significant idiosyncratic aspect of American patent law, to a first-to-file
system."); Blake R. Wiggs, Canada's First-To-File Experience-Should the U.S. Make the
Move?, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y, 493, 504 (1991); Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note
22.
42. See Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S.
Patent System, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559 (2003) (suggesting that
an invention-date focus is grounded in a "natural law principle").
43. See Edwin A. Suominen, Re-Discovering Article 1, Section 8-The Formula for
First-to-Invent, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 641 (2001); Michael F. Martin, The End
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long-cited in support of a move to a first-to-file system, evidences the
minute harm such a change would cause." Indeed, over 99.9% of patent
applications present no dispute as to the identity of the first inventor. 4
It is certainly possible to decouple the priority regimes. Under one
approach, patent races would focus solely on the filing date while appli-
cants would retain the ability to antedate non-competing prior art based
on invention date. A more narrowed approach would limit the use of pre-
filing invention date evidence to overcoming prior art stemming from
pre-filing disclosures by the inventors themselves. 6 Under an alternative
approach, priority contests between competing inventors would focus on
the respective invention dates while other priority issues would rely only
on the filing date. The practical weight given to the invention date could
also be adjusted by shifting the evidentiary requirements for proving pre-
filing priority.
II. USE OF INVENTION-DATE-BASED NOVELTY RIGHTS
DURING Ex PARTE PATENT PROSECUTION
The primary goal of this portion of the study is to answer several
questions: How frequently do patent applicants assert invention-date-
based novelty rights in ex parte patent prosecution? When those rights
are asserted, are applicants successful in proving an early invention date?
And, does the U.S.-style novelty system favor certain groups, such as
independent inventors or universities?
Before presenting the study and its results, I discuss the novelty pro-
visions of U.S. patent law and the process of antedating prior art during
patent prosecution.
NOVELTY RIGHTS & STATUTORY BARS: The core of patent examina-
tion involves a comparison of the claimed invention against the prior art
in order to determine whether the invention is sufficiently new. The over-
lapping anticipation provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),(b),(e), and (g)
of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of Its Origin, 49 IDEA 435 (2009) (suggesting
that the dual sovereignty of state and federal governments led to the first-to-invent system).
44. See supra note 23.
45. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
OF COMMERCE 44 (1992) ("More than 99.9% of the U.S. patent applications now being filed
raise no dispute as to the identity of the first inventor."); see also Vito J. DeBari, Note, Interna-
tional Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-File
Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 707 (1993).
46. This is the most common approach worldwide and is followed by Canada, Japan,
and now China. Lesser, supra note 9, at T 3-4. It is also similar to the proposals found in the
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515 & H.R. 1260, 11 th Cong. (2009).
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substantially define the scope of the prior art.'" These subsections may be
categorized as either novelty provisions or statutory bar provisions. The
novelty provisions of § 102(a), (e), and (g) identify prior art with refer-
ence to the invention date. The statutory bar or "loss of rights" provision
§ 102(b) focuses on activity that occurred more than one year before the
patent application filing date. 8
Subsection 102(a) describes the common forms of publicly available
prior art, that is, all the references theoretically accessible to an inventor
at the time of the invention.4'9 This includes material that is "known or
used by others," "patented" or "described in a printed publication" be-
fore the applicant's invention date."° Subsections 102(e) and (g) both
identify forms of potentially "secret prior art." Subsection 102(e) focuses
on prior patent applications that disclose (but do not claim) inventions. If
such an application is later published, the application will constitute
§ 102(e)(1) prior art as of its filing date.' If such an application is later
issued as a patent, the application will constitute § 102(e)(2) prior art as
of its filing date. The policy rationale behind § 102(e) is that, if another
applicant's earlier-filed application describes the applicant's claimed
invention, the applicant was not the first inventor: "The fact that the
knowledge was not publicly known is outweighed by the USPTO's
knowledge of the invention and its unique role in making patent deter-
minations. ' 2
Subsection 102(g) focuses on competing claims for priority of inven-
torship as follows:
47. Furthermore, § 102(b) has been interpreted to bar the patenting of an otherwise
patentable process based on secret commercial uses of the process by the applicant. See Met-
allizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyor Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 152 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); see also
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But see W.L. Gore & As-
socs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that secret use by
third party does not trigger statutory bar).
48. Three other subsections of § 102 contain statutory bar provisions, but these subsec-
tions focus on the applicant's own behavior rather than intervening prior art. Specifically,
§ 102(c) requires that the applicant not "abandon" the invention; § 102(d) prevents a foreign
applicant from unduly extending the patent term by first obtaining a patent abroad, then later
seeking U.S. patent protection; and § 102(f) denies approval to an applicant if "he did not
himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented." These provisions are infrequently
utilized during the patent prosecution process. MUELLER, supra note 15, at 172 (explaining
that the invalidation of patents under §§ 102(c) and 102(d) "is today a relatively rare event").
49. See infra pt. Il.B (analyzing the prevalence of various forms of prior art based on a
patent citation analysis).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2008) (making certain distinctions between prior art originating
in the United States and in a foreign country).
51. See Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1606, 1609 (B.P.A.I. 2008) ("[A] provi-
sional application can therefore be reasonably considered an 'application for patent' within the
meaning of § 102 (e).").
52. PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 11-43
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328659.
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(1) The first to reduce the invention to practice has priority by
default.
(2) Filing a valid patent application is a constructive reduction to
practice.
(3) The second person to reduce to practice can prevail only if
they were the first to conceive and were diligent from a time
prior to the other inventor's conception through to their own re-
duction to practice.
(4) Any reduction to practice that was abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed cannot defeat patentability by another. 3
Although § 102(g) rarely surfaces during ex parte patent prosecution, the
statutory subsection defines the critical requirements for an applicant to
prove an earlier invention date under § 102(a) or (e)."
The statutory bar provisions of § 102(b) arise when the invention is
"in public use," "on sale," "patented," or "described in a printed publica-
tion" more than one year prior to the effective filing date of the patent
application.55 Once accessible to the public for more than one year, the
statutory bar provisions block the inventor from obtaining patent rights
on the invention. These provisions are supported by a strong policy
"against removing inventions from the public [that] the public has justi-
fiably come to believe are freely available to all as a consequence of
prolonged sales activity.
'56
ANTEDATING OF PRIOR ART: The USPTO does not typically keep a
record of an applicant's date of invention. Rather, when applying the
novelty provisions, patent examiners presume that the filing date of the
application is the invention date. Thus, the applicant must take affirma-
tive steps to assert invention-date-based rights under the novelty
provisions of the Patent Act.
53. Id. at 11-42 (analyzing subsection 102(g)).
54. In my analysis of the 5313 ex parte BPAI cases disposed of in 2008, only three
(<0.1%) decided a § 102(g) issue. Subsection 102(g) is rarely raised during ex parte prosecu-
tion because it demands more information than is ordinarily within the grasp of the patent
examiner. In particular, the statutory subsection calls for a comparison of dates of conception
and reduction-to-practice as well as a consideration of diligence. Such information is not typi-
cally available except in the unusual case where an examiner has first-hand knowledge about
the prior art.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008) (making certain distinctions between prior art originat-
ing in the United States and in a foreign country).
56. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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The rules governing patent practice include specific guidelines for
asserting invention-date-based rights during ex parte prosecution.57 Un-
der 37 C.F.R. § 1.131, the patent applicant may submit an "oath or
affidavit to establish invention of the subject matter of the rejected claim
prior to the effective date of the reference or activity on which the rejec-
tion is based." These submissions have become known as Rule 131
affidavits and typically require the applicant to show "completion of the
invention" before the effective date of the cited reference. 8 Because the
Rule 131 submission often takes the form of a sworn affidavit, this proc-
ess has become commonly known as "swearing behind" or "swearing
back" of a reference. 59
Rule 131 explicitly requires that applicants provide evidence of prior
invention that tracks the elements of § 102(g). Namely, the applicant
must establish either (1) reduction-to-practice of the invention prior to
the effective date of the reference being sworn behind, or (2) conception
of the invention coupled with diligent efforts in developing the invention
from before the effective date of the reference until reduction-to-
practice. 60 "Original exhibits of drawings or records, or photocopies
thereof, must accompany and form part of the affidavit or declaration or
their absence must be satisfactorily explained.,6'
57. See generally Lisa A. Dolak, Patents Without Paper: Proving a Date of Invention
With Electronic Evidence, 36 Hous. L. REv. 471 (1999); Charles L. Gholz, Practicing Under
the New Patent Interference Rules and New Rule 131, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
858, 863 (1995); Edward C. Walterscheid, Rule 131 Practice, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 336
(1975); Henry Hope, Note, Rule 131 Affidavits in Patent Law and Practice: Transformation
from Rule to Reason, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 507 (1966).
58. See In re Stempel, 241 F.2d 755, 759 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (requiring an affidavit to
show the completion of as much of the invention as is disclosed in the prior art reference).
59. See MPEP, supra note 15, at § 201.11. The Rule 131 process is also referred to as
"antedating"
60. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b) (2008). See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 E3d 1321, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (recognizing "actual reduction-to-practice" when the inventor proves: "(1) he con-
structed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the interference
count; and (2) he determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose"); In re
AsahilAmerica, Inc., 68 F.3d 442, 447 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that mere construction can
constitute reduction-to-practice of a sufficiently simple device); Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d
1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding that actual reduction-to-practice requires that the appara-
tus actually existed and worked, not merely that the apparatus was theoretically feasible). For
the level of evidence necessary to demonstrate actual reduction-to-practice, see Ethicon, Inc.
v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asserting that an inventor's
statements regarding the invention must be corroborated by independent evidence); Price v.
Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (declaring that the sufficiency of corroboration
is determined through a "rule of reason" analysis, under which all pertinent evidence is exam-
ined to determine the credibility of an inventor's testimony).
61. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b) (2008); MPEP, supra note 15, at § 715 (providing examiner
guidance on application of the rule including form paragraphs for rejecting affidavits based on
lack of evidence); see In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 716 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (criticizing the
quality of submitted affidavits).
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In addition to the requirement of evidence of prior invention, a pat-
ent applicant's ability to antedate prior art references based on invention
date faces other substantive limitations. Most notably, an applicant can-
62
not swear behind prior art that is made available under a statutory bar.
Second, an applicant cannot antedate a reference in an ex parte proceed-
ing if the reference is a patent or patent application that claims rights toS • 63
the same invention. Rather, in that case, the USPTO may declare an
interference. 64 Or, if the purported prior art also belongs to the applicant,
the examiner may issue a double-patenting rejection.65 Third, the USPTO
will not allow an applicant to swear behind material "clearly admitted on
the record" as prior art.6 Finally, if the applicant's effective filing date is
prior to the effective date of the reference then it would not be necessary
to prove an invention date because the priority of filing will suffice.67
In 1995, the USPTO amended Rule 131 to allow applicants to prove
the dates of inventions that occurred outside the United States in either
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") or World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO") member countries-a group encompassing over
150 potential countries of origin .6 The amendment tracked congressional
62. Ex parte Zaromb, Appeal No. 1996-1556, 1999 WL 33291391 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 9,
1999) (holding that the applicant could not use a 131 declaration to swear behind a 102(b)
reference). The only two types of references that can be antedated using a Rule 131 affidavit
are those available under § 102(a) or (e). MPEP, supra note 15, at § 715.
63. MPEP, supra note 15, at § 715.05.
64. See In re Bass, 474 F2d 1276, 1352 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
65. Ex parte Kam, Appeal No. 1998-1664, 2002 WL 87933 (B.P.A.l. 2002) (holding
that an obviousness-type double-patenting rejection precludes the use of a Rule 131 affidavit
to antedate the reference). The bar on double patenting is a "prohibition against the issuance
of more than one U.S. patent on a particular claimed invention" to the same applicant. MUEL-
LER, supra note 15, at 563. However, an applicant may skirt a double-patenting rejection when
she owns both the reference patent and the application, and the two patent claims are not iden-
tical:
Where the reference patent and the application or patent under reexamination are
commonly owned, and the inventions defined by the claims in the application or
patent under reexamination and by the claims in the patent are not identical but are
not patentably distinct, a terminal disclaimer and an affidavit or declaration under
37 CFR 1.130 may be used to overcome a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
MPEP, supra note 15, at § 715; see also 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2008); MPEP, supra note 15, at
§ 718.
66. MPEP, supra note 15, at § 715 (citing In re Hellsund, 474 F.2d 1307 (C.C.P.A.
1973); In re Garfinkel, 437 F.2d 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Blout, 333 F.2d 928 (C.C.PA.
1964); In re Lopresti, 333 F.2d 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
67. Id. ("Where the effective filing date of applicant's or patent owner's parent applica-
tion or an International Convention proved filing date is prior to the effective date of the
reference, an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 is unnecessary because the reference
should not have been used. See MPEP § 201.11 to § 201.15.").
68. 60 Fed. Reg. 21,043 (May 1, 1995). Prior to this change, Rule 131 was "limited to
facts showing a completion of the invention in the United States." Id.
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changes brought about in the NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, and
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.69
Although the scope of prior art is defined by the anticipation provi-
sions of 35 U.S.C. § 102, many-if not most-prior art rejections occur
in the context of obviousness.70 The rhetoric of races and priority con-
tests truly breaks down in these obviousness cases. Rather, attempts to
antedate simply focus on swearing behind references that teach some
element or elements of a larger invention. Thus, unlike § 102(g) priority
contests, the antedating process is not necessarily directly competitive
because swearing behind a reference is not an automatic challenge to the
patentability of that reference.
For patent applicants, the invention date rules are both a blessing and
a curse. Even when antedating is successfully used to overcome a
USPTO rejection, the resulting patent may still be vulnerable to attacks
during litigation if an opposing party can show an earlier effective date
based on the invention date of the prior art reference or that the reference
had a prior publication date.' In addition, antedating still leaves open a
legal avenue for an opposing party to prove its own prior invention under
§ 102(g).
A. A Study of the Prevalence of Invention-Date-Based Novelty
Assertions in Patent Prosecution Based on the File
Histories of 21,000+ Patent Applications
1. The Data Set
The USPTO maintains a "file wrapper" for each filed patent applica-
tion. The file wrapper includes all substantive correspondence between a
patent applicant and the USPTO. This correspondence is known as the
file history. Over the past several years, the USPTO has transitioned to
an electronic database for storing its records. Using the USPTO elec-
tronic database, I obtained biographical data for 21,000+ randomly
69. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Star. 2057 (NAFrA); Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(URAA).
70. DENNIS D. CROUCH, UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF PATENT AP-
PEALS: Ex Parte REJECTION RATES ON APPEAL (2009), http://ssm.com/abstract=1423922
(showing that the vast majority of appealed examiner rejections are for obviousness). For a
general discussion of the law of obviousness, see KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007).
71. This also occurs during prosecution with the USPTO. See Ex parte Dimarchi, Ap-
peal No. 2004-0250, 2004 WL 1046908 (B.P.A.I. 2004) (rejecting a patent application based
on an additional reference with an effective date earlier than the applicant's sworn invention
date).
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selected72 patent applications filed between 2000 and 2007. 73 The bio-
graphical data includes a listing of affidavit filings. After obtaining the
affidavits, we categorized them by hand to identify those affidavits asso-
ciated with an applicant asserting rights based on the invention date.74
2. The Pervasiveness (or Lack Thereof) of
Rule 131 Affidavit Practice
Of the 21,000+ file histories in the data set, only 0.7% (138) in-
cluded a Rule 131 affidavit asserting invention-date-based novelty
rights.75 Typically, applicants filed these affidavits years after filing the
initial patent application. Both the average time and median time for fil-
ing a Rule 131 affidavit were 33 months after filing the initial
• • 76
application. Table 1 reports the rate of Rule 131 affidavit filing by the
USPTO Technology Center77 for applications filed between 2000 and
72. I used a uniform distribution random number generator to choose the patent appli-
cations to access. The large sample size helps to ensure that it is representative.
73. There are two primary reasons for reaching back only to 1999. First, the file history
records of patent applications filed prior to 1999 are not consistently accurate. Second, prior to
November 29, 1999, the file history records only included information for applications associated
with issued patents, see American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501 (1999), whereas this study includes data on abandoned patent applications as well.
Application file histories do not become public until after publication. In order to ac-
count for the eighteen-month delay between application filing and publication, see 35 U.S.C.
§ 122 (2008) ("[Elach application for a patent shall be published ... promptly after the expira-
tion of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under
this title."), data for this study was only collected from applications filed through the end of
calendar year 2007.
74. Affidavits are filed for several reasons. In addition to those filed under Rule 131,
applicants also submit affidavits under Rule 130 (37 C.F.R. § 1.130 (2008)) to "disqualify
commonly owned patent or published application as prior art" from being used against them
in an obviousness rejection and Rule 132 (37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2008)) as evidence "to traverse
the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided."
75. This very small proportion of positive observations suggests that the distribution is
well-modeled with the Poisson distribution. Using a Poisson distribution, the 95% confidence
interval ("CI") for the expected proportion of file histories containing a Rule 131 affidavit is
0.4-0.9%. Limiting the sample to applications filed from 2000 to 2005 does not change these
results even though most affidavits are filed well into prosecution. See infra note 76.
76. The average time from the application filing date to the date Rule 131 affidavit
submission was 32.6 months ±2.4 months at 95% CI. The median time from filing was 33.1
months. When the sample is limited to applications filed between 2000 and 2005, the average
time from filing moves up slightly to 33.4 months ±2.4 months at 95% CI, and the median
becomes 33.2 months. Note that this difference does not indicate that applicants are filing the
affidavits more quickly. Rather, the difference reflects a skew in the data for recently filed
applications since it would be impossible for a December 2007 application to be associated
with an affidavit filed more than nineteen months from its filing.
77. This analysis was limited to applications filed between 2000 and 2005 to avoid data
skew. Because of the USPTO backlog, many of the more recently filed applications had not
even received an initial action on the merits.
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2005 .7 8Applications in Technology Center 1600-inventions related to
biotechnology and organic chemistry-had the highest likelihood of
containing a Rule 131 affidavit in the file history at 1.43%, while appli-
cations in Technology Center 2800-inventions relating to
semiconductors, electrical, and optical systems and components-had
the lowest likelihood at 0.41%.' 9
AFFIDAVITS FILED MORE FREQUENTLY BY U.S. APPLICANTS: Table 1
also reports an important distinction between applications that claim and
those that do not claim foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119. Those
claiming foreign priority are much less likely to assert invention-date-
based rights than their U.S. counterparts."' I did not, however, find a sta-
tistical difference in affidavit practice given original patent applications
as compared to either continuations or original applications claiming
priority to a provisional application.
TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF RULE 131 AFFIDAVIT FILING
(APPLICATIONS FILED 2000-2005)
Apps with Percent with
R.131 R. 131
Technology Center All Apps Affidavit Affidavit 95% CI
1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 1884 27 1.43%* 0.57%
1700 Chemical and Materials Engineering 2506 21 0.84% 0.38%
2100 Computer Architecture, Software, and 1417 14 0.99% 0.56%Information Security
2600 Communications 2202 18 0.82% 0.40%
2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and 3865 16 0.41%* 0.21%Optical Systems
3600 Transportation, Construction, 2285 16 0.70% 0.36%E-Commerce, Agriculture
3700 Mechanical Engineering, 2806 12 0.43% 0.26%
Manufacturing, Products
Application Origin
Claims Foreign Priority 6709 14 0.21%* 0.16%
No Foreign Priority 10717 115 1.07%* 0.20%
78. See Mark Lemley & Dan Burke, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1696 (2003) (describing some differences in practice between the various technology centers).
79. Statistically, we can reject the null hypothesis that the frequency of Rule 131 affi-
davit filing is equal in these two Technology Centers at the 5% level of significance. The only
other statistically significant difference is between Technology Center 1600 and Technology
Center 3700-Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products. Based on the data here, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the other Technology Centers.
80. Here, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level of significance. This result adds
credence to the survey responders who suggested that the U.S. first-to-invent system "discrimi-
nates against non-US applicants." Response 805103441 to Dennis Crouch, Survey, infra app. 4.
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3. The Effectiveness and Distribution of Rule 131 Declarations
Table 2 shows the current statuses of cases filed under Rule 131 affi-
davits as of July 2009. Compared to the data set as a whole, the cases
with a Rule 131 affidavit were more likely to still be pending and less
likely to be either abandoned or patented by that date.' However, the rate
of patent issuance in completed cases did not differ significantly based
on whether the applicant had filed a Rule 131 affidavit. Among the com-
pleted cases," 76% of applications with a Rule 131 declaration resulted
in an issued patent as compared with 70% of all completed cases in the
data set.
TABLE 2
FINAL STATUSES OF CASES WITH A RULE 131 DECLARATION
(APPLICATIONS FILED 2000-2005)
All Apps with Per cent with R.
Status of Application Apps R. 131 Affidavit 131 Affidavit 95% CI
Abandoned 4331 21 0.48% 0.22%
Pending 2728 42 1.54% 0.49%
Patented 10280 66 0.64% 0.16%
In considering the effectiveness of filing a Rule 131 affidavit, I also
tested whether any major subsequent actions were necessary after the
filing of the Rule 131 affidavit. In only twenty cases (16% of the 129),
the affidavit led directly to the issuance of a patent without a subsequent
office action rejection, request for continued examination (RCE), or ap-
peal. In other words, only 0.12% of applications in the 2000-2005 data
set included a Rule 131 declaration that led directly to an issued patent
without further substantive action. To put this in perspective, a steadily
prolific patent prosecutor may draft and prosecute 800 or so patent ap-
plications in a twenty-year career. During her entire career, we would
expect her to file fewer than one Rule 131 declaration that directly leads
to an issued patent. Notably, antedating was not even necessary in some
of the successful cases: for instance, several applicants had received pat-
ents in Europe without relying upon any invention-date-based priority.
3
One of the most oft-cited advantages of the U.S. invention date focus
is the relative benefit it brings to individual inventors, new entrant small
81. The null hypothesis that likelihoods are equal is rejected at the 1% level of signifi-
cance (P-value ("P")-0.000).
82. I define completed cases as those that have reached a final outcome--either pat-
ented or abandoned.
83. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,097,535 / EP 1247616 (Al); U.S. Patent No. 6,869,647
I EP 1288013 (A2); and U.S. Patent No. 7,476,698 / EP 1427453 (Al).
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 72 2009-2010
Is Novelty Obsolete?
companies, and universities." If any of these groups are disproportion-
ately benefiting from the U.S. system, we would expect them to take
advantage of their invention-date-based rights." To test this hypothesis, I
obtained assignment information (if any) for each application in my Rule
131 affidavit sample, 6 and classified each assignee according to its size
and type. Table 3 details the frequency and effectiveness of Rule 131
affidavit filing for various assignee types.
In both absolute and relative terms, companies---especially large and
publicly-traded companies-claim invention date rights more often and
more successfully than do individual inventors. U.S. publicly-traded
companies appear to be disproportionate users of novelty rights: 61% of
the applications with Rule 131 affidavits were assigned to these publicly-
traded companies. However, the same companies hold only 27% of is-
sued patents."8
84. See generally sources, supra note 20.
85. But see accompanying text, supra note 241 (suggesting that this may not be the
proper comparison).
86. Assignment information was primarily obtained via the USPTO assignment data-
base. Additional patent documents were inspected for applications with no record in the
assignment database. Applications with no assignment information were categorized as indi-
vidual-owned, based on the assumption that patent owners register their assignments or at
least list ownership on the face of the patent documents. This assumption is fairly reasonable
since most patent assignments are indeed registered and since registration benefits the owners
by creating constructive notice of ownership. 35 U.S.C. 261 (2008) ("An assignment, grant or
conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable
consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within
three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.").
However, owners are not strictly required to record their ownership.
87. Types of assignees include: Company, Individual (person), Federal Government
Entity, and University. State universities were classified as universities only, even though they
are also government entities. Companies were categorized based on whether they are large and
whether they are publicly traded on the NYSE or NASDAQ stock market. Large companies
are those with more than $500 million in annual revenue or a publicly-traded market capitali-
zation of over $1 billion. Company websites and Dun & Bradstreet reports were used to obtain
revenue information, extracting the most recent available revenue figures. Wholly-owned
subsidiaries were treated as being the size of the parent corporation. Security interest holders
were not treated as assignees.
88. The 27% figure is derived from the assignment records for patents issued in 2006.
These records are available through the National Bureau of Economic Research Patent Data
Project. See BRONWYN H. HALL ET AL., THE NBER PATENT CITATIONS DATA FILE: LESSONS,
INSIGHTS AND METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8498, 2001). James Bessen reported a 23% figure in looking at a cohort of patents issued in
1991. James Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics, 37 RES.
POL'Y 932 (2008) (calculated from Table 1).
I recognize a limited disconnect between the 61% and 27% figures in that the first meas-
ures the proportion of applications associated with a Rule 131 affidavit and the second reports
the proportion of patents held by publicly-traded companies. This disconnect is unavoidable
because the only population data available is organized by issued patent, and my hypothesis
requires consideration of the effectiveness of patent applicant attempts to antedate by consid-
ering applications that do not issue as patents. However, the data available suggests that this
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Meanwhile, individual usage of invention-date-based novelty rights
did not differ significantly from that expected: the proportion of
applications with Rule 131 affidavits that were filed by individual inven-
tor-owners closely resembled the proportion of inventor-owners in the
general population of patentees. On the other hand, the percentage of
applications with Rule 131 affidavits that were filed by universities es-
sentially doubled the share expected given the ordinary frequency of
university-owned patents. 9 Perhaps surprisingly, applications with Rule
131 affidavits were also much more likely to be filed by government en-
tities than the ordinary frequency of government-owned patents would
suggest.90 The clearly underrepresented group is that of foreign compa-
nies whose applications only represent 10% of those asserting novelty
rights but occupy almost half of the general population of patents. 9'
TABLE 3
FREQUENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RULE 131 AFFIDAVITS BASED ON
ASSIGNEE STATUS (APPLICATIONS FILED 2000-2005)
Percent of
Patents in Allowance Rate:
Applicatio General Percent of Completed Percent of
ns Having Population Cases having R 131 Applications having
R 131 owned by Affidavit that are R 131 Affidavit that
Assignee Type Affidavit Assignee Type Patented are Still Pending
Large Company 89 72% 81% 33%
Publicly Traded U.S. 74 61% 27% 78% 31%
Company
Individual or Unassigned 9 7% 8% 22% 0%
University 6 5% 2% 67% 50%
Federal Government 5 4% 0.4% 100% 50%
Foreign Company 12 10% 47% 100% 25%
All Companies 106 82% 82% 31%
Entity Status
Large Entity 100 78% 77% 78% 32%
Small Entity 29 22% 23% 68% 34%
disconnect is indeed limited. In my sample, the 61% figure, representing the proportion of
applications with Rule 131 affidavits that are assigned to publicly-traded companies, shifts to
59% when looking at the proportion of patents with Rule 131 affidavits that are assigned to
publicly-traded companies.
89. See NAT'L Sci. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2008 tbl.5-40, avail-
able at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/ (providing data that from 2000-2005,
universities received 18,682 U.S. patents, representing approximately 2% of the total 967,980
U.S. utility patents granted during that period).
90. PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, USPTO, REPORT ON PATENTING BY ORGANI-
ZATIONs 2008 at 5 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
topo_08.pdf.
91. Id.
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As measured by allowance rates, companies tend to have much more
success than individual inventors in obtaining patent protection through
the assertion of their invention dates in Rule 131 affidavits.92 As shown in
Table 3, for applications with a Rule 131 affidavit, compare a 78% al-
lowance rate for public-company-owned applications with a 22%
patenting rate for individual-owned applications and 67% for university-
owned applications.3
An alternative way to categorize patent applicants is through the
USPTO owner-status identifier of either large or small entity. Under
USPTO rules, a small entity is entitled to fee reductions for many basic
USPTO fees.94 To qualify as a small entity, an applicant must be (1) an
individual person, (2) a company with fewer than 500 employees, or (3)
a nonprofit organization or university.95 In addition, the patent cannot be
subject to a license or duty to assign to a non-qualifying organization
and, in the case of an individual owner, cannot be subject to any license
or duty to assign.96 1 found that 22% of the applications associated with a
Rule 131 affidavit are legal small-entities-a figure roughly proportional
to the 23% of patents owned by small entities.97 Thus, the legal entity
status does not appear to correlate with any significant difference in Rule
131 affidavit practice. The primary members of the large entity group are
publicly-traded U.S. corporations (the highest users of Rule 131 affida-
vits) and foreign entities (the lowest users of Rule 131 affidavits). They
seem to substantially balance one another in the group results.
92. Here, the allowance rate is calculated based on completed cases (both issued patents
and abandoned applications) and thus ignores those still pending at the time of data collection
in July 2009. The rates calculated here also ignore ancestor or descendent patents. See Cecil
D. Quillen, Jr., & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office-One More lime, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 379 (2009) (discussing
methodologies for calculating allowance rates); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., et al., Continuing Patent
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office-Extended, 12 FED.
CIR. B.J. 35 (2002) (same); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1
(2001) (same).
93. Here, we can reject the null hypothesis that the grant rate for these company-owned
applications is equal to the grant rate for the corresponding inventor-owned applications at the
I % level of significance. We cannot, however, reject the null hypothesis that the grant rate for
company-owned applications is equal to the grant rate for university-owned applications.
Technology center is a potential confounding factor, but it does not appear to influence
the outcome here-largely because the two technology centers with the respective highest and
lowest rate of Rule 131 affidavit filing (TC 1600 Biotechnology and TC2800 Semiconductors)
are the ones also the least likely to be associated with independent inventors. For universities,
the number of patents is simply too small to test for the importance of the technology center.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2008).
95. 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2008).
96. Id.
97. I calculated the population statistic from a sample of 1720 issued patents with filing
dates from 2000 to 2007. See also James Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and
Patent Characteristics, 37 REs. POL'Y 932, 937 (2008) (reporting that the owners of 30.17%
of patents issued in 1991 asserted small entity status).
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4. The Timing of Rule 131 Affidavits
Table 4 shows the timing of the filing of the Rule 131 affidavits rela-
tive to substantive patent prosecution events. The table reports the
relative percentages of the 129 Rule 131 affidavits in the 2000-2005 data
set filed at each stage of prosecution, as well as calculated grant rates.
Very few of the affidavit filings (only 2%) occurred prior to any substan-
tive action. In both such cases, the application was a continuation
application with a long prior history. The vast majority of affidavits
(98%) were filed after a non-final office action had been mailed. Most of
those filings (70% of the total) occurred after the non-final office action
but before any subsequent action, indicating that applicants who file
Rule 131 affidavits tend to do so relatively early in the patent prosecu-
tion negotiation. However, as Table 4 suggests, the "relatively early"
affidavit filings ordinarily include multi-year pendencies.
TABLE 4
THE TIMING OF RULE 131 AFFIDAVITS
Allowance Rate: Percent of
Number of Average Pendency Percent of Completed Applications
Applications From Application Cases having R 131 having R 131
Timing of Filing of with R 131 Filing to R 131 Affidavit that are Affidavit that are
R. 131 Affidavit Affidavit Affidavit (months) Patented Still Pending
Total 129(100%) 33.4 76% 33%
Prior to Substantive 2(2%) 9.0 50% 0%
Action
After Non-Final 127(98%) 33.8 76% 33%
After Non-Final but
Before 90 (70%) 30.0 82% 31%
Subsequent Action
After Final" 37 (29%) 43.1 59% 41%
After RCE 21(16%) 47.0 82% 48%
After Notice of 5 (4%) 38.7 50% 20%
Appeal
After Appeal Brief 4 (3%) 39.3 33% 25%
Application is
Continuation or CIP (29%) 27.7 78% 27%
98. "The term 'Final Rejection' is a classic legal misnomer." Mark A. Lemley & Kim-
berly A. Moore, Ending the Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 66 (2004). A
final rejection does not end prosecution. Rather, applicants still have several prosecution op-
tions even after receiving a final rejection. These primarily include requesting reconsideration
from the patent examiner, filing a request for continued examination under 35 U.S.C. § 132, or
filing an appeal to the BPAI. In fact, the USPTO does not typically have authority to terminate
prosecution except by issuing the patent. Id. at 64 ("While patent examiners can refuse to
allow an applicant's claims to ownership of a particular invention, and can even issue what are
misleadingly called "Final Rejections," the patent applicant always gets another chance to
persuade the patent examiner to change her mind.").
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B. The Applicant Opportunity to Assert Invention-Date-Based Rights
One possible explanation for the infrequent usage of Rule 131 affi-
davits could be that examiners only base their rejections on references
that trigger the statutory bar of 102(b). In fact, that is not the case.
In order to test whether applicants regularly have the opportunity to
antedate references, I measured the frequency at which references cited
during prosecution did (and did not) trigger the statutory bar of § 102(b).99
This distinction allowed me to single out references only available as prior
art under § 102(a) or § 102(e) of the Patent Act, i.e., references that would
be excludable based on evidence of a prior invention date.' °° To do this, I
created a data set of the 500,000+ patents issued from January 2006 to
February 2009. Along with biographical data for each patent, I obtained a
listing of the prior art references cited during the prosecution of each pat-
ent.'0 ' This included over 11 million cited patent references with an
average of 23.0 patent references cited per patent. I then compared the
listed publication date of each cited reference with the earliest priority date
of the underlying patent to determine whether publication of the reference
took place more than one year prior to the filing date. I also compared the
publication date of each cited reference to the filing date of the patent in
which it was cited to account for the possibility that the applicant would
have been unable to claim the asserted priority. Table 5 shows the results:
most patents cite some references that do not trigger the statutory bar of
§ 102(b). Comparing the publication dates of the patent references to the
asserted priority dates of the patents in the data set indicated that 34% of
99. To be clear, this experiment is premised on the assumption that the cited references
are representative of the references actually asserted in prior art rejections. I believe this as-
sumption is reasonable-especially based on the edict on patent applicants to submit
references that a reasonable examiner would consider material to patentability. McKesson
Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F3d 897, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reciting stan-
dard). In the usual process, an applicant does not address all cited references-although this
may become a requirement for certain applications under a proposed set of rules. Dennis
Crouch, USPTO Guidelines for Examination Support Documents (ESD), Patently-O,
http://www.patentlyo.conlpatentl2007/09/uspto-guideline.html (Sept. 13, 2007, 2:42 EST).
Ordinarily, applicants only respond to specific examiner rejections. However, nothing indi-
cates that examiners are any more or less likely to assert prior art in rejections because it
qualifies under the statutory bar.
100. Subsection 102(b) prior art typically involves information that was publicly avail-
able more than one year prior to the applicant's filing date; § 102(a) prior art typically
involves information that was publicly available prior to the applicant's invention date; and
§ 102(e) prior art typically involves third party patent documents that were filed with the
USPTO prior to the applicant's invention date. See accompanying text, supra notes 49-56.
101. For this study, I relied only on prior art "patent data:' including issued patents and
published patent applications, both U.S. and foreign. These represent over 80% of the cited
prior art references. The non-patent references, such as scientific articles or product brochures,
were excluded primarily because their dates were not reliably coded. Thus, at least on this
factor, this section underestimates the absolute number of references cited.
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the cited patent references did not trigger the statutory bar.' °w In contrast,
comparing the publications dates of the patent references to the filing
dates of the patents in the data set indicated that 19% of the cited patent
references did not trigger the statutory bar.' °3 The 19-34 % span here is
based on whether or not applicants are able to fully use their priority as
claimed. As expected, a later effective filing date was associated with more
prior art that qualifies under § 102(b). The patents in the data set cited an
average of 8.0 or, ignoring asserted priority dates, 4.4 patent references not
qualifying as § 102(b) prior art. Of those non-§ 102(b) references, about
two-thirds presumptively qualify as prior art only under § 102(e), while
the remaining presumptively qualify as prior art under § 102(a)."
This result becomes more significant when coupled with the data from
Part II.A. Although important, the § 102(b) statutory bar does not drive the
exceedingly low frequency of attempts to antedate references. '°5
TABLE 5
THE FREQUENCY AT WHICH CITED PATENT REFERENCES Do NOT
QUALIFY AS § 102(B) PRIOR ART AND THUS MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO
EXCLUSION BASED ON EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INVENTION
(520,000 PATENTS ISSUED JAN. 2006-FEB. 2009).
Average (Median) Number
of References Cited
Using Earliest Claimed Using Actual
Priority Date Filing Date
All Cited Patent References 23.0(12) 23.0(12)
§ 102(b) References 15.0 (8) 18.4 (9)
Non-§ 102(b) References 8.0 (3) 4.4 (2)
§ 102(a) References but not § 102(b) 2.4(1) 1.7(1)
References
§ 102(e) References but not § 102(a) or 5.5(2) 2.6(1)
§ 102(b)
102. Seventy-six percent of the patents claimed priority to an earlier filing, such as a
prior U.S. patent application, a provisional U.S. patent application, a foreign patent applica-
tion, or an international application filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT'). Of
those claiming priority, the average claim was for 22 months, and the median claim was for
less than one year. Fewer than 3% of issued patents claimed priority reaching back more than
six years before the filing date.
103. Although I do not present historic data here, this result is likely shifted by the 2001
introduction of published patent applications. The publication of applications creates more
prior art-since some of the published applications will never issue as patents-and allows
examiners to assert the prior art rejections at an earlier date. See supra pt. II.C.
104. This analysis assumes that all patent applications cited as references and having a
publication date after the filing date (or priority date) of the application qualify as § 102(e)
prior art. I use the word "presumptively" because the USPTO would presume during patent
prosecution that these references qualify as prior art based on their publication or filing dates.
105. Subject to the discussion, supra note 99.
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This analysis does not distinguish between prior art references cre-
ated by the applicant ("self cites") and those created by a third party.
Typically, Rule 131 affidavits are only asserted to avoid third party refer-
ences and the process for avoiding self cites is much easier-so long as
those references do not qualify as § 102(b) prior art."" Prior studies of
patent citations have estimated that the owner of the underlying patent is
also the owner of the cited prior art about one third of the time.0 7 Even
excluding those, however, the bottom line remains clear: the statutory
bar is not the driver behind the low frequency of attempts to antedate
references.
C. Provisional Patent Applications as a Functional Substitute
for Invention-Date-Based Novelty Rights
With some caveats, provisional patent applications can serve as
functional substitutes for the U.S. filing grace period.' 8 Indeed, although
not proven here, it is quite possible that it is early provisional patent ap-
plication filings that have largely eliminated the practice of swearing-
behind prior art references.
Provisional patent applications have become popular since being
made available in 1995. ' 9 The USPTO reports that applicants filed
143,030 provisional patent applications in fiscal year ("FY") 2008,
106. See supra pt. II.
107. See Manfred M. Fischer et al., Patents, Patent Citations, and the Geography of
Knowledge Spillovers in Europe, in MANFRED M. FISCHER, INNOVATION, NETWORKS, AND
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS 242 (2006) (calculating, based on studies of patents issued on appli-
cations filed in 1990 and 1995, that 32% of cited references are owned by the assignee of the
underlying patent).
108. See JOSH LERNER, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND COMPETITION, A STATEMENT TO THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HEARINGS ON COMPETITION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 7 (2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/lemerjosh.pdf. ("[The argument that small inventors take
longer to prepare patent applications] appears to be specious [in part because] recent reforms
of the U.S. system have created a new provisional patent application, which is much simpler
to file than a full-fledged application."); See also BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR BILDUNG UND
FORSCHUNG [GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH], ZUR EIN-
FUHRUNG DER NEUHEITSCHONFRIST IM PATENTRECHT-EIN USA-DEUTSCHLAND-VERGLEICH
BEZOGEN AUF DEN HOCHSHULBEREICH [THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN PATENT
LAw-A US-GERMANY COMPARISON BASED ON HIGHER EDUCATION] 3 (2002),
http://www.bmbf.de/pub/neuheitsschonfrist-im-patentrecht.pdf.
109. See New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) ("As a part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the Patent Statute was amended
to allow applicants to file provisional applications that could provide the priority date for a
non-provisional utility application filed within one year of the provisional."); Brian I. Marcus,
Provisional Patent Applications, Their Practical Uses & Potential Pitfalls, 835 PLI/PAT 147,
151 (2005); Sean B. Seymore, The "Printed Publication" Bar After Klopfenstein: Has the
Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV.
493 (2007); USPTO, FILING YEARS AND PATENT APPLICATION SERIAL NUMBERS SINCE 1882,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/stats/filingyr.htm (last visited October 8, 2009).
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compared with 466,147 non-provisional utility applications that year."0
U.S. applicants file a great majority of these provisional applications,"'
which also correspond to more than half of the annual total of utility ap-
plications filed by U.S. residents."'
A provisional application is essentially a low-cost placeholder that
allows an applicant to establish a priority date by filing a description of
the invention along with paying an administrative fee to the USPTO."3
The applicant may later file a non-provisional application claiming the
benefit of the provisional application's filing date."4 The provisional pat-
ent application has a twelve-month non-extendable p During
that time-period, the application is kept secret and is not examined."
6
Thus, to rely upon the provisional priority date, the applicant must sub-
mit a non-provisional application within one year of the provisional
filing date."' Professor Seymore notes several additional strategic advan-
tages of filing provisional patent applications: "extending the patent term
to twenty-one years, postponing the examination period, trolling for
prior art, and avoiding an allegation of inequitable conduct.""' In his ar-
ticle, Mr. Slate expands upon this notion, focusing especially on how a
provisional patent application can be effective when filed early in the
invention development process:"9
110. USPTO, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 at 115 (2008), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf.
111. My study of 13,000 patents issued in 2008 found that only about 18% of patents,
for which ownership had been assigned and priority linked to a provisional application, were
owned by a non-U.S. entity. But see William B. Slate, In Defense of the Misunderstood Provi-
sional Application, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 219, 227 (2003) (suggesting several
reasons why foreign applicants may choose to file for provisional patent rights). Although
Canada has not been one of the top five countries of origin for patentable inventions in the
past decade, USPTO, PATENTS By COUNTRY, STATE, AND YEAR (December 2008), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst-utl.htm, my data shows that Canada
does lead all non-U.S. countries in the filing of provisional U.S. patent applications.
112. See USPTO, supra note l10, at 115-23.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (b) (2008). A drawing must be submitted "where necessary for the
understanding of the subject matter sought to be patented." 35 U.S.C. § 113 (2008).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2008). The non-provisional application must share "at least
one common inventor" with the provisional application. Id.
115. 35 U.S.C. § I ll(b)(5) (2008) ("The provisional application shall be regarded as
abandoned 12 months after the filing date of such application and shall not be subject to re-
vival after such 12-month period.").
116. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2008); USPTO, PROVISIONAL APPLICATION FOR PATENT,
http:llwww.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/provapp.htm (last visited October 9, 2009) ("Provi-
sional applications are not examined on their merits.").
117. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111 (b)(5) (2008).
118. Seymore, supra note 109, at 519.
119. Slate, supra note 111, at 223; see also Charles E. Van Horn, Practicalities and Po-
tential Pitfalls When Using Provisional Patent Applications, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 259, 297 (1994);
Dennis Crouch, Provisional Patent Applications: Waiting to File Non-Provisionals, Patently-
0, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/02/untitled-1 .html (Feb. 22, 2009, 18:11 EST).
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At the time the first application regarding given subject matter is
filed, the applicant will likely be unaware of the most recently-
developed prior art. There is a window of at least eighteen
months immediately previous in which relevant prior art applica-
tions may have been filed but remain unpublished. For
applications not subject to publication, the window between
their filing dates and issuance as patents is likely even longer.
Accordingly, by the time a patent application is examined, sig-
nificant previously unpublished unknown prior art may have
manifested itself. The prospect of being confronted with such
prior art and being forced to responsively amend claims presents
both the question of whether the application fortuitously con-
tains the limitations needed to distinguish the prior art and the
dark cloud of prosecution history estoppel even if such art can
be distinguished. To reduce this problem, even an application
that could otherwise have been filed as a nonprovisional applica-
tion may appropriately be filed as a provisional application.'
20
To test the relevance of provisional patent applications as a tool for
claiming priority, I created a data set of the 620,000+ issued patents for
which applications were filed between 2000 and 2005. For each patent, I
tallied whether it claimed priority to one or more provisional patent ap-
plications. Seventeen percent of the patents in the data set claim priority
to at least one provisional application. 2' On average, the patents
claiming priority listed 1.4 provisional patent applications. Abandoned
non-provisional patent applications have a somewhat higher rate of
claiming priority to provisional patent applications at 22%.2
Collectively, these figures indicate that a large number of provisional
applications are themselves left floundering to be abandoned twelve
months after filing. The large number of abandoned provisional applica-
tions suggests to me that provisional patent applications are likely being
used as early place-holders to cheaply secure a priority date, rather than
as a means of extending the patent term or postponing examination. An-
ecdotal reports suggest that this practice has become especially prevalent
120. Slate, supra note 111, at 227.
121. For a more limited study of the percentage of patents claiming priority to at least
one provisional application, see Dennis Crouch, A First Look at Who Files Provisional Patent
Applications, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.comlpatentl2008/06/a-first-look-at.html (June
3, 2008, 6:05 EST) (finding that 21% of patents issued in April and May 2008 claim priority
to at least one provisional application).
122. Based on a study of 4331 abandoned non-provisional utility patent applications
filed from 2000 to 2005, I found that 22% (969) claim priority to one or more provisional
applications. On average, the abandoned applications that claim priority listed 2.0 provisional
patent applications. Based on these differences, the null hypotheses can be rejected at the 1 %
level of significance.
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among universities developing early stage innovations.23 Additionally, a
small minority of applicants may be using incremental provisional appli-
cations to repeatedly update the disclosure before filing the utility
application. 4 However, the value of incremental provisional application
filings is limited by the hard twelve-month deadline for filing a non-
provisional application.' 5
For an inventor who has conceived a new invention, the legal
benefits of filing a provisional application, rather than relying on the in-
vention date, are compelling. If the filing deadlines are met, a
provisional patent application will serve as conclusive evidence of
priority-without any need for any affidavits or declarations-so long as
the provisional application discloses the invention claimed in the non-
provisional application "in the manner provided by the first paragraph of
section 112." 126 In other words, the specification of the provisional appli-
cation must "contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable" an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the
invention claimed in the non-provisional application.'
27
Unlike an applicant seeking to assert a prior invention date, an appli-
cant claiming priority to a provisional application need not provide
corroborated evidence-or indeed any evidence-of actual reduction to
practice, conception date, or reasonable diligence in working toward re-
duction to practice. Rather, the USPTO and courts treat the filing of a
provisional patent application as a constructive reduction to practice, thus
allowing the applicant to rely on the simple evidence of the paper filing.'
28
An oft-stated disadvantage of provisional application filings is that
they may create a false sense of security among patent applicants. 129 Cer-
123. See Oded Hecht, Extensive Use of Provisional Patent Applications in University
Settings, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June 2006, at 8 (noting that provisional filings provide an
opportunity for market validation prior to utility patent filing); Irving N. Feit & Lauren T.
Emr, Provisional Patent Application, Reality and Myth, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2002, at 8.
124 Indeed, I found that about 3% of non-provisional utility patent applications claim priority
to three or more provisional applications.
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 11 l(b)(5) (2008).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (2008); see New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co.,
298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2008).
128. See Exparte Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1606, 1612-13 (BPAI 2008) (precedential)
("As a constructive reduction to practice, [the] authenticated disclosure [of a U.S. provisional
patent application] serves as prima facie evidence that the applicant was in possession of the
subject matter disclosed in the provisional application when it was filed.").
129. See James Gatto, Patent Appeals Court Ruling Highlights Potential Pitfalls of Over
Reliance on Provisional Patent Applications, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN CLIENT
ALERT, Feb. 2, 2006, at 2-3 (citing New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F3d
1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), available at http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/
92DC5F7E8A4593367E8EB 19227ABE889.pdf.
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tainly, a hastily-filed provisional patent application may fail to properly
describe the invention to be claimed in a later-filed non-provisional ap-
plication. However, the validity of this criticism does not suggest that
applicants should merely rely upon the hope that they will possess suffi-
cient evidence to antedate references based on a prior invention date.
Rather, risk-averse applicants should quickly file a well-supported appli-
cation, either in provisional or non-provisional form.
However, at least four theoretical barriers exist to treating provi-
sional patent applications as a replacement for the grace period. First,
although less expensive 30 and less formal 3' than utility patent applica-
tions, provisional patent applications still ordinarily require the selection
and identification of the particular inventions to be submitted to the
USPTO. This process may be more burdensome than merely retaining
evidence of conception and reduction to practice. However, it may well
be less burdensome and less prone to error than maintaining evidence of
." 132
diligence.
Second, accompanying the effort of preparing the provisional appli-
cation is the likely delay that occurs in filing the provisional application.
Delay may be especially likely for new entrants into the patent system
who may need additional time to understand the system, hire counsel,
and create their own project pathway. 3  Likewise, university departments
responsible for patenting are notoriously slow. In addition to the delay in
filing-which in the absence of a grace period would postpone the earli-
est potential priority date-applicants also reduce the eventual length of
the patent term by filing the follow-on utility application less than one
year after filing of the provisional application. 4
The third problem is that of settled expectations. Although the 1995
creation of provisional patent applications is relatively recent compared
with the Constitutional origins of the U.S. patent system, the provisional
130. Provisional application filing fees were $220-or $110 for a small entity-in fiscal
year 2009. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(d) (2008). Payment of this filing fee permits the applicant to
submit a provisional application up to 100 pages in length. Longer provisional applications
trigger a surcharge of $270-or $135 for a small entity-for each additional 50 pages. 37
C.F.R. § 1.16(s) (2008). By comparison, non-provisional utility patent application filing fees
total $1090, which includes the $330 basic filing fee, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(l) (2008), a $540
search fee, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(k) (2008), and a $220 examination fee, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(o)
(2008). Lengthy non-provisional applications trigger additional surcharges. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.16(h-i) (2008).
131. Provisional application are not required to include claims and are not examined. 35
U.S.C. § 111 (b) (2008).
132. See infra pt. l.F (discussing the difficulty of establishing an invention date).
133. See generally sources, supra note 28.
134. See Dennis Crouch, Provisional Patent Applications: Waiting to File Non-
Provisionals, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.compatent/2009/02/untitled-l.html (Feb. 22,
2009, 18:11 EST).
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patent application process has existed long enough that the application of
most in-force patents occurred after the new filing form became avail-
able. During this entire time, provisional applications have in essence
extended the grace period rather than replace it. In my study of Rule 131
affidavits, 29% of applications with Rule 131 affidavits also claimed pri-
ority to a provisional application.'35 For those applications, the purpose
of the Rule 131 affidavit was to push novelty rights beyond even the
provisional application priority date. Thus, in the settled rights construct,
provisional applications may not substitute for Rule 131 affidavits be-
cause applicants already rely on both regimes simultaneously.
The fourth issue is the legal limitation of provisional rights. A provi-
sional patent application only allows an applicant to reach back up to
one year, while the invention-date-based grace period allows an appli-
cant to antedate § 102(e) prior art that may have been filed years
before.
13 6
D. Analysis of the Use of Invention-Date-Based Novelty Rights
During Prosecution of Higher Value Patents
Patent values are highly skewed.' Most patents have a modest
value, while a much smaller quantity are "highly valuable." Quite often,
patent applicants know that particular pending patent applications are
highly valuable, and those applications may veer along a unique prose-
cution course that is more careful and deliberate. '38 Supporters of
invention-date-based novelty rights may argue that such rights, although
rarely asserted, make a big difference in big cases.
In this section, I want to answer the following question: Are inven-
tion-date-based novelty rights asserted more frequently during the
prosecution of valuable patents than during patent prosecution gener-
ally? To answer this question, I created two data sets of "valuable
patents" based on separate selection criteria. For the first set, I looked for
patents that have been associated with litigation. Mr. Allison et al. have
suggested that litigated patents are more valuable, on average, than non-
litigated patents:
We start from the assumption that litigated patents are at least a
subset of the most valuable patents, and we have no reason to
believe that valuable patents that are not litigated differ in any
135. Notably, however, these applications amounted to less than 1% of all applications
claiming priority to a provisional application.
136. CHISUM, supra note 17, at § 3.08.
137. Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 141,142 (2008).
138. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 451 (2004).
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systematic ways from valuable litigated patents. We conclude
that the easiest way to discover the characteristics of valuable
patents is to study litigated patents.139
Thus, to create my first "valuable patents" data set, I compiled the prose-
cution file histories of a randomized sample of 3070 litigated patents
filed between January 2000 and July 2009.
For the second "valuable patents" data set, I selected patents listed in
the FDA's "Orange Book."' ° The Orange Book lists patents covering
various aspects of FDA-approved drugs. These drug patents are typically
highly valuable and have specialized legal protections.1 4 ' Thus, to create
my second "valuable patents" data set, I compiled the prosecution file
histories of all 806 patents that were issued between 2000 and 2009 and
are listed in the Orange Book.
Following the same procedure outlined Part Il.A. 1, one reviewer ex-
amined each affidavit filed during the prosecution of the patents in each
data set and identified those affidavits asserting invention date rights.
4 2
Those affidavits were typically labeled as Rule 131 affidavits by the ap-
plicants.
Of the 3070 litigated patents, 2.5% (78) were associated with a Rule
131 affidavit asserting pre-filing invention date rights.143 Although small,
this rate is more than quadruple the rate of Rule 131 affidavit filing for
all patents.14 Of these 78 patents, 96% (75) are of U.S. origin, and 37%
(29) stretch the priority date further by claiming rights to a provisional
patent application.
Of the 806 patents listed in the Orange Book, 2.2% (18) were asso-
ciated with a Rule 131 affidavit asserting pre-filing invention date rights.
Here, it does not make sense to compare the rate of affidavit filing for
the Orange Book patents to that of the general population of patents be-
cause Technology Center 1600 examined each of these 18 patents. As
139. See Allison et al., supra note 138, at 437.
140. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., AP-
PROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (29th ed. 2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/orange/obannual.pdf.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2008) (creating a cause of action for patent infringement based
on a generic manufacturer's request for FDA approval of a drug covered by a patent listed in
the Orange Book).
142. For the procedure used to identify file histories including Rule 131 affidavits, see
supra pt. Il.A.
143. Limiting the sample to applications filed between 2000 and 2005 does not change
the reported percentage. Of the 2686 litigated patents in my data set with filing dates between
2000 and 2005, 2.5% (68) were associated with a Rule 131 affidavit filing.
144. See infra tbl.6. We can reject the null hypothesis that the rate of litigated patents
being associated with a Rule 131 affidavit is equal to the corresponding rate for either the
general population of applications or the general population of issued patents at the 1% level
of significance.
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noted above, Technology Center 1600 had the highest rate of applica-
tions associated with Rule 131 affidavits of any technology center
(1.4%).145
In an insightful follow-on paper to Valuable Patents, Ms. Moore
considered the properties of "worthless patents.' ' 6 As a premise for her
paper, Ms. Moore identified worthless patents as those patents that were
allowed to expire due to failure to pay maintenance fees.417 Using a simi-
lar methodology, I created a compilation of 494 issued patents with
filing dates between 2000 and 2005 that had expired by July 2009 due to
failure to pay maintenance fees. Of those patents, only 0.4% (2) were
associated with a Rule 131 affidavit asserting pre-filing invention date
rights.
TABLE 6
RATE OF RULE 131 AFFIDAVIT FILING BY PATENT CATEGORY
Category Count Rate
All Applications 17,426 0.7%
All Patents 10,280 0.6%
Litigated Patents 3,070 2.5%
Expired Patents 494 0.4%
Orange Book Patents 806 2.2%
Patents in TC 1600 1,884 1.4%
These results appear in Table 6 and support several potential inter-
pretations. Notably, pushing back against the original presumption of
value in litigated patents is the prospect of Rule 131 affidavits actually
leading to more litigation by exposing weaknesses in the patents. The
following section explores this possibility through a qualitative analysis
of practitioner surveys.
E. Survey of Reliance on Invention-Date-Based
Novelty Rights During Patent Prosecution
1. Survey Design and Dissemination
In the summer of 2009, I conducted an electronic survey of 1141 re-
sponders-mainly self-identified U.S. patent law professionals. These
individuals primarily include registered U.S. patent attorneys and agents
145. See supra pt. II.A. Comparing the overall rate of affidavit filing in Technology
Center 1600 with the rate of affidavit filing in the Orange Book patents, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the two rates are equal.
146. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521 (2005).
147. Id. at 1526.
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and patent litigators. 4 The purpose of the survey was to elicit practitio-
ner estimates of the reliance upon invention-date-based novelty rights
during patent prosecution. 49 The survey was also intended to provide
some understanding of patent applicants' relative preference for filing
Rule 131 affidavits as compared to other avenues of prosecution, such as
simply arguing that the invention to be patented is non-obvious when
compared with the putative prior art. The survey additionally considers
how these experiences and preferences correlate with support for the
U.S. first-to-invent system over a potential first-to-file system. "' I
grouped responders according to their reported qualifications, 5 2 area of
business or technology,"' and position.
5 4
In creating the survey, I sought to obtain both quantitative and quali-
tative results. Thus, the survey asked applicants to select objective
responses from a list of choices and provided an opportunity for appli-
cants to more fully explain their answers.' 5 The survey was kept short to
ensure a higher completion rate. A printed version spans only two
pages. 1 6 The median responder took fewer than three minutes to com-
plete the survey and 90% of the responders completed the survey in
fewer than ten minutes.
I primarily disseminated the survey online through the Patently-O
website and to opt-in subscribers of the Patently-O daily e-mail for one
month during the summer of 2009. '5 In addition, I posted a notice of the
survey to the Patently-O group on Facebook.'58 I used the online survey
148. Ninety-four percent of responders self-identified as either patent attorneys or agents
registered to practice before the USPTO or as unregistered U.S. attorneys handling patent law
issues. Other responders included law students, inventors, professors, patent examiners, and
other government officials. Considerable overlap existed between these categories.
149. See infra app. 1, questions 1 and 2.
150. See infra app. 1, question 3.
151. See infra app. 1, question 4.
152. Listed qualifications included U.S. Attorney, Registered U.S. Patent Attor-
ney/Agent, Inventor, Patent Litigant, Law Student, and Patent Examiner (current or former).
153. Listed areas of business included Litigation, Marketing, Licensing, Business Strat-
egy, Academic, and Other. Listed areas of technology included Biotechnology,
Pharmaceutical, Generic Pharma, Telecommunications, Financial Services, Chemical, Me-
chanical, Software, Automotive, Nanotechnology, Electrical, Medical Devices, and Other.
154. Listed positions included In House Attorney/Agent, Law Firm (Litigation), Profes-
sor, Inventor, Owner, Examiner (Patent Office), Law Firm (Prosecution), Student, Business
Management, Judiciary, and Consultant.
155. For full results of the objective questions on the survey, see infra app. 2. For a com-
plete listing of explanatory responses, see infra apps. 3-4.
156. See infra app. 1.
157. Dennis Crouch, Survey: Swearing Behind Prior Art, Patently-O,
http://www.patentlyo.comlpatent/2009/06/survey-swearing-behind-prior-art.html (June 2,
2009,07:57 EST).
158. Patently-O etc. Facebook Group, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=
4012000626&ref=ts (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
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tool SurveyMonkey to administer the survey.159 Participants were given
the opportunity to list their name and contact information, but were told
that identifying information would otherwise be kept anonymous. 60The introduction to the survey provided the following information:
US Patent Examiners generally search for prior art dated before
the priority filing date of the application being examined. How-
ever, on occasion, an applicant can 'swear behind' prior art by
showing that its invention date came before the cited art. To do
this, an applicant files a Rule 131 declaration. Of course, even
under current law, the invention date is meaningless if the prior
art creates a statutory bar (having been published for more than
one year before the applicant's priority filing date).
Pending legislation would largely eliminate an applicant's ability
to use the invention date to avoid prior art. Rather, in a "first-
inventor-to-file" system the question is simply whether the ap-
plicant's effective filing date [occurs] before the prior art date
(with some potential caveats).
We have no evidence indicating how often applicants use Rule
131 declarations. As such, we really cannot predict the impact of
a move to first-to-file. This survey is intended to obtain some
data. 161
2. U.S. Attorney and U.S. Patent Agent Participation
in Rule 131 Declarations
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics of U.S. Attorney and U.S. Patent
Agent survey responses regarding their participation in Rule 131 affida-
vits.'62 The majority of these responders (83%) indicated that they have
"participated in the filing of a Rule 131 affidavit.' 6 Those who have
participated in the filing of Rule 131 affidavits have a much higher esti-
mate of the percentage of cases that they have "worked with" that
include a Rule 131 affidavit. In particular, responders who participated in
159. SurveyMonkey, http://www.surveymonkey.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). Al-
though not foolproof, SurveyMonkey uses an algorithm that allows only one response per
computer. I did not detect any evidence of attempts to manipulate the voting. Most responders
provided some qualitative responses, and there were no duplicates in these responses.
160. See infra app. 1, question 8.
161. See infra app. 1.
162. Although over 1000 survey respondents self-identified as either a U.S. Attorney or
U.S. Patent Agent, there is no way to ensure that the respondents represent a random or repre-
sentative sample of patent law professionals. Thus, I make no claim that these results can be
extended as a predictive estimate of that larger population.
163. See infra app. 1, question 1.
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the filing of a Rule 131 affidavit estimate that, on average, 3.1% of the
cases they have worked with involve a Rule 131 affidavit. Responders
who have not participated in the filing of a Rule 131 affidavit estimate
that, on average, 0.9% of the cases they have worked with involve a Rule
131 affidavit. 164
TABLE 7
SURVEY OF U.S. ATTORNEY AND U.S. PATENT AGENT
PARTICIPATION IN RULE 131 AFFIDAVITS
Ever Participated in Number of Estimated Percent of Cases with




Chart 1 shows a cumulative frequency of the reported percent of
cases worked with that include a Rule 131 affidavit. This data shows that
70% of responders estimate that the percentage of their cases associated
with a Rule 131 affidavit filing is either "close to 0%" or "2%."
Table 8 groups the practitioners into two broad areas of technology:
(1) Chemistry, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology (Chemistry) and (2)
Electrical Engineering, Telecommunications, and Software (Electrical).
The results show a significant difference between the groups based on
the average estimated percent of cases that they have worked with that
include Rule 131 affidavits. Although the absolute percentages are still
small, the Chemistry group reported a much higher average estimate
than did the Electrical group. These results are consistent with the oft-
presented notion that on a per-patent basis, patents related to chemistry,
pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology are more valuable than those related
to electrical engineering, telecommunications, or software.6 These two
164. The median responses are "2%" and "close to 0%" respectively for responders who
have and have not participated in the filing of a Rule 131 declaration. This data is derived
from the results of Question 2. Infra app. 1. Question 2 allowed the following set of potential
responses: "close to 0%", 2%, 4%, 6%, ... 20%, and "more than 20%." Id. Responses of
"close to 0%" were treated as responses of 0.0% in the average calculation, while responses of
"more than 20%" were treated as responses of XX%. Since only four respondents selected
"more than 20%," the numerical value assigned to XX% did not meaningfully impact the
study averages.
165. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
ThEci. L.J. 1155, 1156(2002).
For a discussion of the connection between the value of a patent and the rate of Rule 131
affidavit filing, see supra pt. U.C.
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broad areas of technology also tend to have substantial differences in
patent prosecution practices."
TABLE 8
SURVEY OF PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO TECHNOLOGY AREA
Ever Participated in Average Estimated Percent of
Practitioner Area of Technology R. 131 Affidavit Cases with R. 131 Affidavit
Chemistry, Pharma and 384(84%) 3.6%
Biotechnology
Electrical, Telecom, and Software 462 (80%) 2.1%
CHART 1
CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF THE ESTIMATED PERCENT OF CASES









2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% More
than
20%
Estimated Percent of Cases with R. 131 Affidavit
3. Support for Moving to a First-to-File System
The survey asked responders whether they support a move to a first-
to-file system."' As Table 9 shows, a small majority of the U.S. attorney
and patent agent responders (55%) indicated that they did not support
such a move. The responders in the survey who favored a shift to first-to-
file indicated that they had slightly less experience with filing of Rule
131 affidavits and in handling cases associated with Rule 131 affidavits.
166. Id.
167. See infra app. 1, question 4.
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TABLE 9
SURVEY OF SUPPORT FOR A MOVE TO A
FIRST-TO-FILE (FTF) SYSTEM
Support Move to a FTF Ever Participated in R. Estimated Percent of Cases
System Count 131 Affidavit with R. 131 Affidavit
No 569(55%) 84.0% 2.9%
Yes 470 (45%) 82.5% 2.5%
The results in Table 9 parallel other opinion surveys in demonstrat-
ing some support for U.S. adoption of a first-to-file system amongst
patent practitioners. 16' For instance, based on a 1993 survey, the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") reported that 66% of major
U.S.-based patent owners either "strongly" or "generally" supported
adoption while only 22% opposed adoption. The GAO's survey was
admittedly skewed toward large companies and did not include univer-
sities or other governmental agencies. 69 In their survey, the largest
companies, "with more than 10,000 employees, were most supportive
of a move to first-to-file, with 75 percent supporting it and only 16
percent opposed."'
70
The responders were given space to provide short written statements
regarding their preference for or against a move to first-to-file."' The
statements largely track the historic debate presented in Part I, and create
a richer data set susceptible to qualitative analysis and categorization
according to a set of iteratively created themes that emerged from the
statements for each statement received.' 72 The themes in each statement
were identified and tallied in Table 10. Some statements were coded for
168. See Allan Mendelowitz, General Accounting Office, Testimony before the US Pat-
ent & Trademark Office: US Companies' Views on Patent Law Harmonization (October 7,
1993), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/patents/txt/011394.txt; see also Robert L. Rohr-
beck, Patent System Policy Planning, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
COMM. REP. 65 ("[T]he majority of the members of the committee who responded to the sur-
vey did not favor adoption of the first to file system.").
A 2007 poll of 192 readers of Inside Counsel magazine asked, "Should the U.S. adopt a
first-to-file application system, replacing the first-to-invent system?" Forty-five percent of
responders answered "Yes"; 29.1% answered "No;" and the remaining 26.9% answered
"Don't know." IP Survey: Patent Reforms; Proposed changes for the patent system get mixed
reviews from in-house counsel, Inside Counsel 56 (October 2007) at http://www.
insidecounsel.com/assets/article/1421/IC 1007-p52-54p56p58p60p62p64.pdf.
169. See Mendoliwitz, supra note 168.
170. Id.
171. Four hundred (35%) of the 1141 responders offered some expositive statement
explaining their strategic choice selection. For a complete listing of the qualitative responses,
see infra apps. 3-4.
172. For a discussion of how explanatory responses can be used for qualitative analysis,
see generally KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK 219-223
(2002).
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multiple themes. For example, the following statement was coded as
including the themes of simplicity, predictability, and international har-
mony: "Simpler for inventor and practitioners to deal with. Gives some
predictability to system that is not very predictable. Aligns the U.S. sys-
tem with the rest of world."'
3
TABLE 10
EXPLANATORY THEMES OF PREFERENCES
FOR FIRST-To-FILE AND FIRST-TO-INVENT SYSTEMS
Support Move to First-to-File
Explanatory Theme Yes No
Constitution Demands Preference 0.6% 6.3%
Preference Is More Cost Effective 13.6% 4.5%
Preference Benefits Small Entities 3.6% 30.3%
Preference Better Encourages Innovation 0.0% 1.8%
Preference Simplifies the Law 29.6% 2.7%
Change Will Not Make Much Difference 5.3% 2.7%
Preference Creates Predictability 16.6% 0.5%
Alternative Reduces Patent Quality 0.6% 16.3%
Alternative Creates Enablement and 0.0% 3.2%
Written Description Problems
International Harmony 30.8% 2.3%
Preference Maintains Status Quo 0.0% 6.3%
Preference Is More "Fair" 2.4% 9.0%
Responders who support the switch to a first-to-file system most of-
ten cited international harmonization (30.8%) and simplification (29.6%)
in explaining their preferences. The following three examples were typi-
cal:
Simpler-Interferences are so rare.1
[B]ecause it's such a mess dealing with all the international dif-
ferences and that would start some better international-based
prosecution structure, hopefully.'75
173. Response 804179645 to Dennis Crouch, Survey, infra app. 4.
174. Response 805552837 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
175. Response 804977690 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
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Simplicity and harmonization 1 6
A handful of supporters of the first-to-invent system acknowledged
that a switch would bring the United States in line with the rest of the
world ("ROW"), but challenged the value of harmony. The following
examples are typical of this sentiment:
Placing our patent system in line with the rest of the world's first
to file system will bring the US system down to the relatively in-
effective level of the rest of the world's patent systems. It will
also lead to more poorly written patents.
77
The system has its flaws, no doubt. But, that does not mean that
Europe is simply correct on everything and we need to follow
their lead. First to invent gives smaller/more cost sensitive enti-
ties a better chance at patentability.
7
A significant number (16.6%) of supporters of a switch to a first-to-
file system also cited added predictability.
Responders who do not support the switch to a first-to-file system
most often cited benefits to small entities, universities, and individual
inventors from the first-to-invent system (30.3%) and argued that a first-
to-file system would reduce patent quality (16.3%). The following four
examples are typical of these sentiments:
I believe in a first to invent system. I think it is unfair for indi-
vidual inventors and small businesses to have to file before they
are financially able to and it puts more pressure on attorneys to
complete the applications faster.
79
A race to the patent office will lower "patent quality" (Haste
makes waste)."
While it would make things simpler to have a first to file, I don't
think it would benefit universities who only have early stage
technologies.""
176. Response 804473969 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
177. Response 808826549 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
178. Response 804694995 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
179. Response 804411483 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
180. Response 804192506 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
181. Response 805059426 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
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My clients are early stage companies; FTF favors the big play-
ers, not my clients, and rubs against the American ethos of "I got
there first."'
82
Opposing these thoughts were several responses complaining that
the present U.S. first-to-invent system "discriminates against non-U.S.
applicants.' 83
Additionally, at least one responder recognized that small inventors
are unlikely to attempt to antedate asserted references:
The concern tends to be for the small inventor but in my experi-
ence small inventors never attempt a rule 13 1.'
Both sides argued that their preferred system is more cost effective.
First-to-file supporters focused on removing costs of "determining the
date of invention" during prosecution and enforcement proceedings.'85
First-to-invent supporters suggested that a first-to-file system would lead
to more applications being filed before inventions are screened for value
and that "rush" jobs simply cost more.116
A number of responders indicated that they would support a hybrid
approach: focus solely on the filing date for priority contests but allow
an inventor to claim priority to the invention date in cases of intervening
prior art. However, responses also questioned the modern role of a grace
period. For instance, one response indicated that "[t]he idea that an in-
ventor might test the commercial waters before filing a patent
application is anachronistic in my view.'
8 7
Finally, patent practitioners indicated a concern that a change to
first-to-file would open the door to malpractice claims for delays in fil-
ing:
First to file would create potential malpractice liability for attor-
neys that fail to prepare and file applications "in a reasonable
time"-whatever that is later interpreted to mean.
182. Response 804518811 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
183. Response 805103441 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author). See also
accompanying text, supra note 68. Despite a shift toward allowing proof of non-US invention,
very few non-US applicants take advantage of the option.
184. Response 804877686 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
185. Response 808947839 to Dennis Crouch, Survey, infra app. 4 ("As a litigator who
sees myself on the defense side a lot, it would add additional certainty at the outset of a
case.").
186. Response 805331197 to Dennis Crouch, Survey, infra app. 4 ("The rush to file
quickly would increase cost because it would reduce the ability to schedule the work.").
187. Response 805079708 to Dennis Crouch, Survey, infra app. 4.
188. Response 804763278 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
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Potential malpractice claims for "untimely" preparation/filing.'89
4. Strategies and Pitfalls of Asserting First-Inventor
Rights During Patent Prosecution
The final substantive question of the survey focused on the relative
strategic merits of (1) asserting first-inventor rights to negate putative
prior art references or (2) distinguishing the scope of the invention from
the disclosures found in the references. Responders were offered a hypo-
thetical situation where either strategy might succeed. The question read
as follows:
Assume that you receive non-final prior art rejection. You be-
lieve that you could distinguish the reference without amending
any of your claims. However, you also have sufficient evidence
to swear behind the reference based on an earlier invention date.
Which approach do you take?190
Responders were asked to choose one of three options: "Swear be-
hind the reference," "Distinguish your claims from the prior art," and
"Swear behind the reference and distinguish the claims." In addition,
responders were asked to "Explain your answer."
The responses to this question are tabulated in Table 11, which
shows a large preference for distinguishing claims from the prior art
rather than asserting first-inventor rights by filing a Rule 131 affidavit.
While 51% of responders would have distinguished the claims, only
31% would have asserted first-inventor rights, and 18% would have at-
tempted to both distinguish the claim and assert first-inventor rights.'9'
The responders in the survey who would have distinguished the claims
showed more support for a shift to first-to-file and indicated that they
had comparably less experience in handling cases associated with Rule
131 affidavits. However, those differences were not statistically signifi-
cant.
189. Response 817328944 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
190. See infra app. 1, question 3.
191. These percentages have a margin of error of 3% at 95% CI.
Fall 2009]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 95 2009-2010
96 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:53
TABLE 11
SURVEY OF STRATEGIES FOR ASSERTING
FIRST-INVENTOR RIGHTS
Strategy in Response to Support Move to a Estimated Percent of Cases
Prior Art Rejection Count FTF System with R. 131 Affidavit
Assert First-Inventor Rights 336(31%) 44% 3.1%
Distinguish Claims 544 (51%) 48% 2.6%
Both 193(18%) 39% 2.7%
Many responders offered an expositive statement of their strategy se-
lection. 92 These results create a richer data set susceptible to qualitative
analysis. 93 Analysis and categorization according to a set of themes that
emerged from the statements allowed for a thematic tallying in Table 12.
TABLE 12
STRATEGY THEMES IN CHOOSING WHETHER









Choice Driven by Costs 21.1% 3.4% 13.0%
Choice Increases Odds of Obtaining Patent 8.3% 4.7% 33.
Protection
Choice Provides Shorter Prosecution Timeline 4.1% 1.3% 5.2%
Alternative Creates Litigation Problems (Validity and 40.4% 6.7% 19.5%
Inequitable Conduct) I
Alternative May Cause Estoppel and Narrow Claim 6.4% 71.1% 1.3%
Scope
In the Aftermath of KSR, Nonobviousness is More 0.0% 1.3% 3.9%
Difficult to Prove
Alternative is a Tacit Admission 6.4% 1.3% 7.8%
Alternative is Only a Last Resort 7.8% 0.0% 2.6%
Responders who preferred to assert first-inventor rights primarily
mentioned the concern that distinguishing the prior art creates potential
estoppel issues that would limit claim scope. '94 The following examples
embody typical responses:
192. Four-hundred and forty-four (39%) of the 1141 responders offered some expositive
statement explaining their strategy choice selection.
193. See NEUENDORF, supra note 172.
194. See infra app. 4.
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Swearing behind the reference limits the amount of prosecution
history estoppel in the case and avoids making statements on the
record that may later be used to limit the scope of the claims. 9
Why go on the record against your claims when you can make
the prior art disappear?'9
It is crazy to make any substantive argument to distinguish over
a reference that is not in fact prior art. Why limit the interpreta-
tion of your claims?
97
Responders who preferred to distinguish the claimed invention from
the prior art rather than assert first-inventor rights most often mentioned
the concern that Rule 131 declarations create their own litigation prob-
lems by raising questions of invalidity and inequitable conduct. 98 he
following examples embody typical responses:
[Because] swearing back does not provide absolute victory (as a
102g date may later be found), I would always attempt to distin-
guish first, all other factors being equal' 99
I would prefer to avoid the risk of an unintentional error in the
declaration. If discovered, it would raise inequitable conduct
(perhaps groundless, but would still have to be defended) and
raise a question of validity.200
131 declaration should be a last resort. [T]he resulting patent is
weaker (creates [inequitable conduct] issues, defendants can
195. Response 804298036 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
196. Response 805007971 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
197. Response 804298036 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
198. See infra apps. 3-4. For representative cases involving allegations of inequitable
conduct in connection with the filing of Rule 131 affidavits, see, e.g., Greenwood v. Hattori
Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241-42 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court's finding of
inequitable conduct based on submission of a misleading Rule 131 affidavit, where the district
court had made express finding of no intent to deceive); Timely Prod. Corp. v. AnTon, 523 F2d
288, 298 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding a patent unenforceable due to applicant's filing of a fraudu-
lent Rule 131 affidavit).
199. Response 805122973 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author). The potential
revival of art via 102(g) is discussed in S.F. Raizes, Are Claims Obtained by the Use of Rule
131 Affidavits or Terminal Disclaimers Valid?-The Application of Section 102(g), 56 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 699 (1974); see also Richard G. Berkley, Some Practical Aspects of Amendment
Practice in the Electro-Mechanical Arts, 426 PLI/PAT 161, 213-214 (1995) (recommending
that practitioners forego filing Rule 131 affidavits in favor of arguing patentability without
conceding that the reference is prior art).
200. Response 804966046 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
Fall 20091
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 97 2009-2010
98 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:53
prove an earlier date, etc) plus it looks bad-as if you're admit-
ting your claims are obvious over the cited reference."'
Many responders shared the concern that swearing behind a cited
reference while failing to distinguish the claims on their merits "looks
bad" and amounts to a tacit admission that the reference is good but for
its effective date. Indeed, one self-described former examiner suggested
that swearing behind a reference without addressing the scientific merits
of the reference creates a specific challenge for a patent examiner-to
find the same prior art, but with an earlier effective date:
Swear[ing] behind the reference may satisfy some, but most [ex-
aminers] will try to thwart the swear behind by locating another,
similar reference. Practically speaking, to get the case allowed,
amend the claims minimally, distinguish from the prior art, and
lastly swear behind it, in that order. This provides the examiner
202
enough cover to allow the case.
Some of the responders (12.2%) offered the reminder that patent
prosecution is an ongoing process-a series of events or a story
unfolding.0 3 Many suggested that if one argument fails, an applicant
should move to the next argument. However, many responders, who in-
dicated that they would both assert first-inventor rights and distinguish
the invention, suggested that the better approach is to include all argu-
ments within a single response. The following examples embody typical
responses:
If you don't swear behind at the non-final stage the office will
go final and not accept the 131 dec[laration] at that stage without
the filing of a[ Request for Continued Examination]. A similar
situation arises if you rely on the dec[laration] and don't argue to
distinguish. You'll have to file an RCE to get the arguments con-
sidered.2"'
As an examiner, I can tell you this is the best way to get around
the reference. More than likely one or the other submitted [sic]
on its own will likely have some deficiency. Therefore, doing
both will be more persuasive. 05
201. Response 804891985 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
202. Response 804927752 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
203. Most prosecution histories include multiple iterations between the examiner and
applicant offering both new arguments and nuances on previous arguments.
204. Response 804192506 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
205. Response 804497967 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
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Taking the "belt-and-suspenders" approach of both filing a 131
and distinguishing the claims saves time and money for my cli-
ent. Just because the Examiner has cited a reference with a
certain date does not mean that s/he cannot make another rejec-
tion based on other art that has an earlier date for the base
reference. I prefer to be safe and plan for both eventualities, as
long as the claim amendments do not drastically change the
206
claim scope.
Responders who indicated that they would both assert first-inventor
rights and distinguish the invention most often mentioned that their ap-
proach increases the odds of obtaining patent protection.20
The cost of patent prosecution certainly drives some applicant be-
havior. There was some disagreement, however, on which choice was the
least-cost mechanism. On one hand, 21.1% of responders who preferred
to distinguish the invention suggested that their choice was at least par-
tially driven by the high cost of preparing and filing a successful Rule
131 declaration:
It generally costs much less to distinguish prior art than to do
everything necessary to file a 131 Declaration.2°'
Declarations are more work. Specifically, gathering facts related
to conception + diligence or actual RTP is time consuming.2°9
As a practical matter, it's often difficult to track down corporate-
type inventors two or three years after the app is filed, so as to be
able to get them to sign a Rule 131 dec[laration].2 °
A handful of responders who preferred to assert first-inventor rights in-
dicated that was the cheaper approach:
It is hard to justify to the client doing all the extra work of dis-
tinguishing the claims 2
Finally, 13.0% of responders who selected the dual strategy suggested
that-in the long run-their approach was more cost-effective.
206. Response 804197733 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
207. Percentage of responders fitting this description: 33.8%.
208. Response 805531415 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
209. Response 806995065 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
210. Response 804343519 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
211. Response 805114796 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
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I would provide both arguments in order to minimize client costs
and to minimize further PTO mailings and loss of time.2 '
5. Survey Conclusions
The survey results contrast somewhat with the analysis presented in
Part II.A. It appears that the actual frequency of attempts to antedate ref-
erences during prosecution is less than expected by practitioners in the
field.23 The discontinuous objective response criteria may have contrib-
uted to the discrepancy in result. For instance, even if a responder knew
that exactly 0.7% of her cases included Rule 131 affidavits, it is unclear
whether the responder would have chosen the "close to 0%" response or
the "2%" response.
F. Measuring the Success of Invention-Date-Based
Rights Assertions Adjudged by the BPAI
After being twice-rejected by a patent examiner, a patent applicant has
a right to appeal to the USPTO's administrative court, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"). The BPAI is an active court, which
issues several thousand decisions each year.214 To study BPAI decisions,
we first used a broad search criterion of BPAI decisions in Westlaw.2" The
resulting decisions were reviewed to identify whether the BPAI made a
decision regarding an attempt to antedate one or more references.
We identified 73 BPAI decisions that adjudged the merits of an at-
tempt to antedate.2" 6 As shown in Table 13, the BPAI rejected the attempt
to antedate in 77% (56) of these decisions, accepted the attempt to ante-
date in 22% (16), and partially accepted and partially rejected the
attempt to antedate in 1% (1).2
17
212. Response 804718925 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author). See also
Response 804197733, supra note 222.
213. Compare accompanying text, supra note 75 (suggesting that only 0.7% of non-
provisional utility applications filed between 2000 and 2007 included a Rule 131 affidavit
asserting first-inventor rights), with supra tbl.7 (reporting average practitioner estimate that
2.7% of non-provisional utility applications include a Rule 131 affidavit asserting first-
inventor rights).
214. Crouch, supra note 70.
215. Federal Intellectual Property-Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences Decisions
(FIP-BPAI) Database, Thomson Reuters/West, available at http://www.westlaw.com. Search
string: ("37 cfr 1.131" "swear behind" antedat! (date /2 invent!) (date /3 (conception! con-
ceiv!)) (reduc! /3 practice) & ti("ex parte")).
216. Remands for insufficient briefing were not tabulated.
217. For the lone partial rejection, see Ex parte Cho, Appeal No. 2008-1739, 2009 WL
64619 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 12, 2009) (holding that the patent applicant had not antedated the refer-
ence with respect to Intemet address limitations but had antedated the reference with respect
to other recited limitations).
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TABLE 13
SUMMARY OF BPAI DECISIONS ON ATTEMPTS TO ANTEDATE
Decision on Attempt
to Antedate Count Percent
Affidavit Accepted 16 22%
Affidavit Rejected 56 77%
Partially Accepted and Partially Rejected 1 1 %
In each rejected case, the applicant had filed a Rule 131 declara-
tion,2 8 but the BPAI rejected those declarations for a variety of reasons,
including insufficient evidence to establish reduction to practice prior to
the effective date,219 insufficient evidence to prove conception and/or
218. But see Ex parte Reuning, Appeal No. 2006-0580, 2007 WL 1813753 (B.P.A.I.
June 25, 2007) (denying a rehearing because the appellant did not present the declaration with
the brief), vacated in part, 276 F. App'x 983 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
219. See Ex parte Knaus, Appeal No. 2007-4016, 2009 WL 1878041 (B.EA.I. June 29,
2009) (holding that the declarations were insufficient in character and weight as to establish
reduction to practice prior to the effective dates of the other references); Ex parte Molander,
Appeal No. 2008-2589, 2009 WL 726751 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 17, 2009) (holding that the appli-
cant's declaration failed to show both conception and reduction to practice); Ex parte Saito,
Appeal No. 2008-5777, 2008 WL 5371879 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2008) (holding that the
applicant's declaration failed to show reduction to practice); Ex parte Satchell, Appeal No.
2008-0071, 2008 WL 4828136 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 6, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declara-
tion failed to show reduction to practice); Ex parte Yao, Appeal No. 2008-3285, 2008 WL
4190000 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 11, 2008) (holding that the appellants had not met their burden of
supplying a sufficient factual basis to establish that they reduced to practice or had possession
of the broadly-claimed genus prior to the effective date of the reference); Ex parte Barber,
Appeal No. 2008-3284, 2008 WL 4143435 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 4, 2008) (holding that the applicant
did not establish reduction to practice or due diligence from the time of conception to the
reduction to practice or filing of the patent application); Ex parte Rhoades, Appeal No. 2007-
1611, 2008 WL 2200065 (B.PA.I. May 28, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declaration
failed to show reduction to practice.); Ex parte Henry, Appeal No. 2007-2777, 2008 WL
761095 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 21, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show both
conception and reduction to practice); Ex parte Jung, Appeal No. 2007-2283, 2007 WL
4137539 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 20, 2007) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show re-
duction to practice); Ex parte Schatz, Appeal No. 2007-1335, 2007 WL 2814106 (B.P.A.I.
Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that the applicant could not antedate a prior art reference with a Rule
131 declaration citing constructive reduction to practice in a previously filed, co-pending ap-
plication because the instant application was not entitled to the benefit of the previously-filed
application's filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120); Ex parte Jackson, Appeal No. 2007-2532,
2007 WL 2382020 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 20, 2007) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to
show conception and actual reduction to practice); Ex parte Jameson, Appeal No. 2006-1699,
2006 WL 3448636 (B.EA.I. Nov. 15, 2006) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to
show conception and reduction to practice); Ex parte Tracy, Appeal No. 2002-0913, 2002 WL
33948411 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 12, 2002) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show
reduction to practice); Ex parte Ragan, Appeal No. 1997-2246, 2002 WL 31234513 (B.P.A.I.
2002) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show either diligence or reduction to
practice); Ex parte Prywes, Appeal No. Appeal No 1995-0423, 1995 WL 1718843 (B.PA.I.
1995) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show either diligence or reduction to
practice); Ex parte Dunne, 20 U.S.EQ.2d 1479 (B.P.A.I. 1991) (holding that the applicant's
declaration failed to show reduction to practice); Ex parte Kitamura, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1787
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reasonable diligence toward reduction to practice, 20 failure to assert
conception of the entire claimed invention,22' failure to prove prior con-
ception of the elements taught in a reference, failure to show countryof " • 223 in en o s, fal
of invention, failure to include signatures of all listed inventors, fail
(B.P.A.I. 1988) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show reduction to practice);
cf Gholz, supra note 23, at 181 ("An actual reduction to practice requires construction of the
claimed invention even if the invention is simple.").
220. See Ex parte Das Sharma, Appeal No. 2009-0030, 2009 WL 1709135 (B.P.A.I.
May 29, 2009) (holding that the applicant's declaration was insufficient to prove conception
and diligent reduction to practice ); Ex parte Hey, Appeal No. 2008-3614, 2008 WL 4752050
(B.P.A.l. Oct. 28, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show a date of in-
vention prior to the reference); Ex parte Di Carlo, Appeal No. 2007-3016, 2008 WL 5583419
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 25, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show date of con-
ception prior to the reference); Ex parte Mostafazadeh, Appeal No. 2007-4270, 2008 WL
544097 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 28, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show the
requisite diligence); Ex parte Bianchi, Appeal No. 2007-2938, 2008 WL 227982 (B.P.A.I. Jan.
28, 2008) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show conception); Ex parte
Krimm, Appeal No. 2007-2003, 2007 WL 2228672 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 3, 2007) (holding that the
applicant's declaration contained no evidence of which country the invention was made in and
no evidence of diligence); Ex parte Global Patent Holdings, L.L.C., Appeal No. 2006-0698,
2006 WL 3824921 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 5, 2006) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to
show conception and diligence); Ex pane Perry, Appeal No. 2001-0238, 2004 WL 77083
(B.P.A.I. 2004); Ex parte Hwang, Appeal No. 2002-2055, 2003 WL 25283829 (B.P.A.I. Aug.
29, 2003) (holding that the applicant's declaration failed to show diligence); Ex parte
Kirkwood, Appeal No. 2002-0405, 2003 WL 23014530 (B.P.A.I. 2003); Ex parte Karpen,
Appeal No. 2001-1918, 2003 WL 25277976 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 24, 2003) (holding that the appli-
cant's declaration failed to show conception prior to the reference); Ex parte Igelmund,
Appeal No. 1999-0653, 1999 WL 33291408 (B.P.A.I. 1999); Ex parte Hyatt, Appeal No.
1998-1913, 1999 WL 33206107 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 8, 1999) (holding that the applicant's declara-
tion failed to show conception and diligence); Ex parte Peppel, Appeal No. 1998-2848, 1998
WL 1766687 (B.P.A.I. 1998) (holding that the applicant's declarations did not establish con-
ception of the claimed invention coupled with diligence to the filing date); Ex parte Wilk,
Appeal No. 1997-0939, 1997 WL 1948973 (B.P.A.I. 1997) (holding that the applicant's decla-
ration failed to show diligence).
221. See Ex parte Draper, Appeal No. 2008-4038, 2009 WL 1007622 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 14,
2009); Ex parte Reuning, Appeal No. 2006-0580, 2007 WL 1813753 (B.P.A.I. June 25, 2007;
Ex parte Peppel, Appeal No. 1998-2848, 1998 WL 1766687 (B.P.A.I. 1998) (holding that the
applicant's declaration covered somewhat different claims).
222. See Ex parte Cho, Appeal No. 2008-1739, 2009 WL 64619 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 12, 2009);
Ex parte Spencer, Appeal No. 2007-0082, 2007 WL 2814095 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 25, 2007).
223. Ex parte Krimm, Appeal No. 2007-2003, 2007 WL 2228672 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 3,
2007). For a discussion of invention country requirements, see supra pt. II.
224. Ex parte Li, Appeal No. 2009-1605, 2009 WL 1796049 (B.P.A.I. June 22, 2009);
Exparte Horn, Appeal No. 2007-3908, 2008 WL 194237 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 23, 2008) (finding the
applicant's declaration inadequate because it was signed only by one of the inventors, failed to
show reduction to practice, and failed the antedate the reference); Ex parte Woodruff, Appeal
No. 2001-1055, 2003 WL 25277886 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 30, 2003) (finding the applicant's declara-
tion inadequate because it was signed by only one inventor). But see Brief of Appellee
Macdermid Printing Solutions, L.L.C., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid Printing
Solutions, L.L.C., 525 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1568) (noting that the USPTO had
accepted DuPont's Rule 131 declaration even though it "was not signed by all parties, and thus
failed to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.131").
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ure to allege a sufficiently early conception date,225 failure to properly
explain submitted evidence, attempt to antedate a reference that quali-
fies as a statutory bar under § 102(b),227 claims to the same invention as
the prior art (thus necessitating an interference proceeding),2 8 failure to
properly submit the affidavit,2 29 and an attempt to double-patent.
230
One survey respondent expressed this difficulty in a comment:
It is extremely difficult to get a 1. 131 declaration accepted. One
nearly needs to justify each day. Personally, I think it would be
close to impossible to antedate over 6 months based upon con-
structive reduction to practice. If it is more than 2 months, I
231would probably be a waste of the client's money to try.
225. See Ex parte Beanstalk Ventures Co., Appeal No. 2008-4348, 2009 WL 1707156
(B.P.A.I. May 29, 2009); Ex parte Lai, No. 2009-00007, 2009 WL 160232 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 21,
2009); Ex parte Hey, Appeal No. 2008-3614, 2008 WL 2951731 (B.P.A.I. July 31, 2008).
Typically, an applicant fails to allege a sufficiently early conception date when the asserted
reference is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and the court finds that the reference enjoys
the benefit of a parent application's filing date. See Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1606
(B.P.A.l. 2008)(holding that a provisional application is considered an "application for patent"
within the meaning of § 102(e)).
226. See Exparte Daniels, Appeal No. 2008-0568, 2009 WL 1683017 (B.P.A.I. May 20,
2009) (holding that the applicant's Rule 131 affidavit failed to sufficiently explain the content
of the project documents or how the information therein established reduction to practice or
conception and diligent reduction to practice); Ex parte Kern, Appeal No. 2008-0495, 2008
WL 867822 (B.PA.I. Mar. 28, 2008) (rejecting the applicant's declaration because it made no
attempt to correlate the evidence of conception with the limitations of the claims).
227. See Expane Zaromb, Appeal No. 1996-1556, 1999 WL 33291391 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 9,
1999) (holding that the applicant could not use a Rule 131 declaration to swear behind a
§ 102(b) reference); Ex parte Alleman, Appeal No. 1996-2121, 1996 WL 1749143 (B.P.A.I.
1996); Ex pare Scott, Appeal No. 1996-1931, 1996 WL 1749114 (B.P.A.I. 1996).
228. See Exparte Hottovy, Appeal No. 2008-5794, 2008 WL 5417239 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 29,
2008) (holding that the applicant's Rule 131 declaration was invalid because the application
and the reference claimed the same patentable invention, and priority could only be estab-
lished through an interference proceeding); Ex parte Zacharias, Appeal No. 2002-0741, 2002
WL 32346094 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 6, 2002); Ex parte Blalock, Appeal No. 1999-2347, 2002 WL
33952591 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 23, 2002) (holding that the applicant's Rule 131 declaration was
invalid because the application and the reference claimed the same patentable invention, and
priority could only be established through an interference proceeding); Ex parte Clark, Appeal
No. 1996-2058, 1996 WL 33120499 (B.P.A.I. 1996) (holding that the applicant's declaration
was ineffective because the application and the reference were claiming the same invention);
Ex parte Standish, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1454 (B.P.A.I. 1988) (holding that the applicant's Rule 131
declaration was invalid because the application and the reference claimed the same patentable
invention, and priority could only be established through an interference proceeding).
229. See Ex parte Reuning, Appeal No. 2006-0580, 2007 WL 1813753 (B.P.A.I. June
25, 2007) (denying the applicant's appeal because the applicant did not present the declaration
with the brief).
230. See Ex parte Karn, Appeal No. 1998-1664, 2002 WL 87933 (B.P.A.I. 2002) (hold-
ing that obviousness-type double patenting barred the applicant from antedating a reference).
231. Response 804529601 to Dennis Crouch, Survey (on file with author).
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G. Use of First-Inventor Rights During Interference Proceedings
This Article focuses on ex parte prosecution proceedings. However,
because inter partes interference proceedings are so intertwined with
proposals for patent reforms that would eliminate the invention-date-
based novelty rights, they bear at least some mention."2 Interference
proceedings are exceedingly rare.233 In FY 2009, the USPTO declared
fifty-five interference proceedings.M In FY 2008, the USPTO declared
only sixty-six. 35 This FY 2008 figure would represent less than 0.02% of
the nearly 400,000 patent application disposals in FY2008.236 Moreover,
the late-filer attempting to claim priority based on prior invention usually
loses to the first-to-file.37
232. Interference proceedings are defined under 35 U.S.C. 135(a), and their procedure is
spelled out in MPEP, supra note 15, at § 2300. "Interfering subject matter" exists when an
applied-for claim-if prior art-would "have anticipated or rendered obvious the subject mat-
ter of a claim of the opposing party and vice versa." Christian J. Garascia, Evidence of
Conception in U.S. Patent Interference Practice: Proving Who is the First and True Inventor,
73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 717, 719-26 (1996).
233. The rarity of interferences is well-understood because interference statistics have
been available for some time. See George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate: First-to-
Invent vs. First-to-File, 1967 DUKE L.J. 923 (1967); Gholz, supra note 18; Michael Martin,
The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its Origin, 49 IDEA 435 (2009);
Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, I U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 9 (1992);
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO PATENT LAW HAR-
MONIZATION TOWARDS A MORE INVENTOR-FRIENDLY WORLDWIDE PATENT SYSTEM § 4
(1996), http://www.aipla.org/harmoniz.html (estimating that 99.95% of patents are issued to
the first inventor to file an application claiming a given innovation); LERNER, supra note 108,
at 6 ("Thus, the U.S. persists in this complex, costly, and idiosyncratic system in order to
reverse the priority of 0.03% of the patent applications filed each year.").
234. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND
INTERFERENCES PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/officesldcom/bpai/docslprocess/fy2009.htm; see also Ian A. Calvert & Michael Sofo-
cleous, Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1989 to 1991, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 822 (1992).
235. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND
INTERFERENCES PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/dcombpai/docs/process/fy2008.htm.
236. A patent application disposal is counted when a patent application either issues as a
patent or is abandoned. In FY 2008, the USPTO reported 396,228 patent application dispos-
als. USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FY2008 tbl.I, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf.
237. See Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1840 (B.P.A.I. 2001) (noting an
approximately 75% success rate for the first-to-file); Charles Macedo, First-to-File: Is Ameri-
can Adoption of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 543 (1990); Mossinghoff, supra note 23, at 427 (stating that between 1983 and
2000, the first-to-file won 1917 of the 2858 interference cases). But see Gholz, supra note 23,
at 181 (reporting that USPTO data suggests that the first-to-file has recently been winning in
only 52.5% of the cases).
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By the end of FY 2009, only forty-four interference proceedings
were pending, down from fifty-two at the end of FY 2008.38 On average,
the interference proceedings begin and end within a year. For the first
three quarters of FY 2009, terminated interference proceedings averaged
23910.6 months pendency with 93.9% terminated in less than two years.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Very few patent applicants successfully assert invention-date-based
novelty rights during patent prosecution. Of course, that statistic alone
does not resolve the question of whether the United States should retain
its unique system that allows for an invention date focus. To the contrary,
the relatively minor administrative burden of judging the quality of Rule
131 affidavit submissions suggests that the novelty provisions may be an
appropriate safety valve to avoid the potential harsh result of a delay in
filing a patent application. This administrative burden appears especially
small when compared with the efforts required to conduct an interfer-
ence proceeding or even to determine the patentability of a claimed
invention. 2"° In any event, the USPTO could impose a fee in connection
with Rule 131 affidavit filings, as it does with Section 8 affidavit practice
in trademark law. On the other hand, assuming that small entities are
more fee-sensitive than large entities, the imposition of a fee requirement
would further reduce the relative value of potential invention-date-based
rights for those applicants.
The U.S. novelty rules have previously been thought to preferen-
tially benefit independent inventors, new entrants, and basic researchers.
The evidence presented here does not support that conclusion. However,
it is important to recognize that the assertion of invention-date-based
novelty rights is not a zero-sum game or a David-versus-Goliath compe-
tition. Rather, the fact that large companies assert their novelty rights
does not necessarily diminish the value of patent rights held by other
entities.14' Thus, small entities may still reap benefits from their invention
date rights even though large companies reap more benefits. Indeed,
238. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND
INTERFERENCES PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, supra note 234.
239. BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES PERFORMANCE MEASURES,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/perform/fy2009b.htm.
240. Gholz, supra note 18, at 891 (estimating the private cost of an interference proceed-
ing at over $100,000).
241. A patent is an exclusive grant and does impact the rights of the rest of the popula-
tion. However, a general argument against patent rights does not address the specific question
of whether invention-date-based novelty rights offer social value.
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conflicting rights are least likely in the most common cases: where a
prior art reference is applied as one part of an obviousness analysis.
In addition to public administrative costs, patent applicants hoping to
prove their invention date face the private cost of maintaining sufficient
records. However, those costs are associated with a purely private
choice. As discussed in Part II, the U.S. system defaults to a filing-date
focus, thus providing applicants with a choice. Those whose private
costs of compliance are too great can settle for the default.
The results detailed in the Article show that non-U.S. entities are the
least likely of any group studied to assert invention-date-based novelty
rights . Although the law no longer differentiates based on the location
243of an invention, the patenting culture may not have shifted, even
though U.S. patent filings by non-U.S. entities are at an all-time high,
and more non-U.S. entities file for protection in the United States than in
any other country around the world.24 U.S. entities likewise file more
patent applications outside of their home country than do entities from
any other country. 24' Thus, it appears that the lack of a uniform rule on
invention-date-based novelty rules is not substantially deterring appli-
cants from taking advantage of rights outside of their home country.
The most concerning issues associated with invention-date-based
novelty rights involve the fuzzy patent grant and information asymmetry.
A third party considering the validity of a U.S. patent typically does not
have information regarding the invention date and consequently cannot
know whether apparent prior art would be antedated in a later trial or
reexamination. The statutory bar of § 102(b) mitigates the problem by
creating a clear demarcation for public information available more than
one year before the patent's filing date. However, as discussed in Part
II.C, a substantial portion of relevant prior art does not trigger the statu-
tory bar. Thus, manufacturers conducting freedom-to-operate or
infringement analyses are left merely to speculate on the potential inven-
tion date that might later be proven.
The fuzzy boundary is present with respect to almost every issued
U.S. patent, and supporters of filing-date-only rights consider this to be
one of their strongest talking points. Ironically, in the present system, the
fuzzy boundary in issued patents is most clearly eliminated when the
applicant has submitted a Rule 131 affidavit with invention date evi-
dence during prosecution. In those cases, the applicant has identified a
prior invention date. In this light, the rules of proving a date of invention
242. See supra pt. H.A.
243. So long as the invention was created in one of the 150+ NAFrA or WTO countries.
244. WORLD PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL REVIEW (2008), http://www.wipo.int/
ipstats/en/statistics/patents/wipo pub_931 .html.
245. Id.
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during patent prosecution might be seen as unduly strict whereas a more
liberal approach could help solve the later-felt information gap. There
are other creative solutions available. The USPTO could require appli-
cants to submit invention date information in order to preserve rights or
alternatively require applicants to submit a fee in order to preserve prior-
inventor rights. These approaches should likely be rejected because of
their added complication and up-front costs to applicants-both of
which tend to have a greater negative impact on small entities. To answer
these questions, I suggest a follow-on project studying post-grant asser-
tions of invention-date-based novelty rights for cases involved in patent
litigation and reexamination.
Although invention-date-based novelty rights are typically associ-
ated with a first-to-invent priority system, a final purpose of this paper is
simply to highlight the distinction between these two aspects of the U.S.
patent system. Although both stem from similar policy goals, their modi-
fication in proposed legislation should be separately justified. In
particular, elimination of the priority contests outlined in § 102(g) (i.e.,
first-to-invent rights) need not alter the ability to antedate third-party
prior art.
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